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This article connects the constitutional jurisprudence of the
family to debates over reproductive technology and surrogacy. Despite
the outpouring of literature on reproductive technologies, courts and
scholars have paid little attention to the constitutional foundation
of parental rights. Focusing on the structural/political function of
parental rights, this article argues that a gestational mother has a
constitutional claim to be recognized as a legal parent.
The article first discusses the "unwed father cases." Despite
believing that natural sex differences justified distinctions in parental
rights, the Supreme Court crafted a test giving men parental rights
if they established relationships with their biological children. The
article argues that the Court modeled this test on its view of the
essential attributes of motherhood. The article also shows how this
theoretical approach supports feminist claims for equal treatment
despite biological difference, such as accommodation of pregnancy.
Turning to current debates, the article focuses on divided
motherhood: usually surrogacy contracts, but also embryo mix-ups at
fertility clinics. Rather than following existing precedent on parental
rights, the law of high-tech parenthood is tending sharply in the di-
rection of denigrating gestation, defining parenthood exclusively in
terms of genes or contracts. Conferring parental rights on gestational
mothers would produce better outcomes and be more consistent with
the best aspects of existing constitutional precedents.
I. WHAT MAKES A MAN A FATHER?
MEASURING UP TO MOTHER
A. Biological Fathers' Rights Against the State:
Stanley v. Illinois
B. Biological Fathers'Rights Against Mothers
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. Many thanks to my
research assistants, Archie Fallon and Jessica Webb, for their work on this article. Great
thanks also to Susan Frelich Appleton, Ben Barton, Susan Carle, Iris Goodwin, Steve
Hendricks, David Meyer, Martha Minow, Hari Osofsky, Carol Parker, Glenn Reynolds,
Deborah Smith, Gary Spitko, Mae Quinn, and all the participants in the 2006 May
Gathering for their many valuable comments. Earlier versions of this article were
presented at the 2006 May Gathering at the University of Virginia, the 2006 conference
of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and the 2007 annual meeting of the
American, Association of Law Schools, at which it received Honorable Mention in the
AALS Scholarly Papers Competition.
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C. Accommodating Fathers
1. Reproductive Biology as a "Real Difference"
2. The Role of Marriage
3. A Fork in the Road
II. WHY PROTECT PARENTHOOD?
THE RIGHT AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS
A. The Constitutional Meaning of Parenthood
B. Constitutional Justifications for Parental Rights
1. The Concrete Connection Between Parent and
Child
2. The Political Role of the Family
III. WHAT MAKES A WOMAN A MOTHER?
ESSENTIALISM AND BIOLOGY
A. The Problem of Essentialism
B. The Role of Genes
C. Family Citizenship
CONCLUSION
This article connects the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of sex
equality to debates over reproductive technology and surrogacy con-
tracts. Reproductive biology is the "real difference" most often in-
voked to justify sex classifications in the law.1 The Court has held, for
example, that a state employer has no constitutional duty to accom-
modate the burden that pregnancy puts on women's participation in
a workplace designed for "non-pregnant persons."2 In contrast, the
Court has required the state to accommodate men's biological disad-
vantage in the area of parental rights.3 The Court's test for defining
men's parental rights shows how the Equal Protection Clause can be
used to accommodate sex differences and attain meaningful rather
than superficial equality. The test is also a useful starting point for
assigning parental rights in modern disputes arising out of repro-
ductive technology.
In a series of cases in the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that un-
wed fathers can, in some circumstances, be entitled to parental rights,
and so struck down state laws that deemed only the mother a legal
parent of a non-marital child.4 The Court reached this outcome as a
matter of sex equality. The Court's theory of equality, however, was
more nuanced than in other sex discrimination cases. Acknowledging
1. See infra Part I.C.
2. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
3. Cf. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 303 (1990)
(noting "the biological disadvantage men experience in accessing child-nurturing
opportunities").
4. See infra Part I.
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that biological fatherhood entailed less inherent connection to a child
than biological motherhood, the Court created a standard by which
fathers could be recognized as equal to mothers, despite men's biolog-
ical disadvantage. Although the Court's rulings elevated the rights of
men, they did so by defining parenthood in terms of motherhood and
making fatherhood fit a female model. These cases stand alone in the
Court's jurisprudence of sex discrimination in taking the female ex-
perience rather than the male as the baseline. They also stand alone
in demanding accommodation for the disadvantaged sex.5
The Court's more recent treatment of fathers retreats from the
accommodation approach, as do lower court decisions involving un-
wed fathers and, more recently, disputes over motherhood. The un-
wed father cases took the identity of the mother as given, but science
has since split biological motherhood into two parts: begetting by the
"genetic mother" and bearing by the "gestational mother."6 The free
market has splintered off a third role: expecting. Formerly a euphe-
mism for pregnancy, it now applies to an "intended mother," who can
achieve this state by contracting out the begetting and bearing.7 Law
has lagged behind, trying to decide which mother (genetic mother, ges-
tational mother, or intended mother) is the true mother. Courts mak-
ing that decision have largely failed to apply the unwed father cases,
which offer a definition of parentage grounded in constitutional re-
quirements. Instead, new proposals for determining parentage range
from the purely genetic to the purely contractual. Many of these pro-
posals minimize or eliminate the parental rights of the gestational
mother, especially, but not only, if she has signed a surrogacy contract
purporting to relinquish her parental rights.
Such proposals change the definition of parenthood from a
woman-centered one to a man-centered one and in the process deni-
grate the non-genetic aspects of biological reproduction. Proposals
that favor enforcement of surrogacy contracts also commodify ges-
tation and create perverse incentives to use riskier rather than safer
reproductive technology.' Recognizing parental rights in the gesta-
tional mother would be more consistent with the best aspects of exist-
ing constitutional precedents and, for the most part, would produce
better outcomes. 9
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a 'Parent"? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 354 (1991).
7. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 311.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Legal scholarship on the question of surrogacy contracts runs the gamut from those
who argue that such contracts should be enforced, on either constitutional or policy
grounds, to those who argue surrogacy arrangements should be treated no differently
from other adoptions. Those in favor of enforcement include JOHN A. ROBERTSON,
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I use the word essentially in the title of this article with tongue
somewhat in cheek. This article does not argue that women (or ges-
tational mothers) are essentially "maternal" in the sense of being in-
herently more nurturing or loving toward children than are men (or
other women). Instead it adopts the view reflected by precedent that
women and men both have the capacity to love a child deeply and that
active engagement in caring for a child brings out this capacity. Exist-
ing precedent also correctly recognizes gestational mothering as the
baseline for judging who is a parent for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment: when the Supreme Court decided when and how a man
acquires parental rights, it based its standard on mothering.' ° That
standard should be the starting point for constitutional assignment
of parental rights, and it raises troubling questions about current ap-
proaches to resolving cases of disputed motherhood. That the Court
created this standard for the benefit of men is all the more reason why
feminists should be suspicious of the ongoing search for a different
set of rules to apply to the claims of women.'
CHILDREN OF CHOICE 125-26 (1994) (focusing on procreative liberty rights of contracting
couple); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 913-17 (2000) (focusing on lack
of established relationships at birth, gender-neutrality, and stereotypes about mother-
child bond); Hill, supra note 6, at 414-16 (1991) (focusing on certainty, contract principles,
and but-for causation); Schultz, supra note 3 (focusing on intended parents' commitment,
gender-neutrality, and concern for stereotyping women). Writers opposed to enforcement
by specific performance include MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 75-96
(1988) (arguing that surrogacy should be treated like other adoptions); Mary Lyndon
Shanley, "Surrogate Mothering"and Women's Freedom: A Critique of Contracts for Human
Reproduction, 18 SIGNS 618, 625-33 (1993) (analyzing surrogacy as alienated labor). A
third position, which is gaining popularity, would enforce the contract only when the ges-
tational mother is not also the genetic mother. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional
Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the
Biological Father's Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 97, 136-41 (2006); see also
Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1077, 1121 (1998) (arguing that the state may choose policy when parties to a
surrogacy contract are in conflict over the agreement). I generally agree with those who
would class surrogacy contracts with other adoptions, making them voidable by the ges-
tational mother regardless of her genetic relationship with the child. This article sets out
the constitutional underpinnings of parental rights as they pertain to the gestational
mother's claim.
10. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971) (considering the father's nurturing of
the children, nurturing being a stereotypically maternal function); see also infra Part I.C.
11. Surrogacy is sometimes portrayed as a service one woman provides to another,
and the resulting dispute as between two women contending for the role of "mother." In
the more common "traditional surrogacy" arrangement, however, the contract is between
the husband/genetic father and the woman who is the genetic as well as the gestational
mother. The wife who anticipates adopting her husband's genetic offspring has no bio-
logical role in the creation of the child. In "gestational surrogacy," the child is conceived
through in vitro fertilization, using gametes from either the intended parents or donors
but not from the gestational mother. This article refers to the surrogates' claims to parental
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Part I of this article describes how the Supreme Court used its
idea of the essential traits of motherhood to create a test for when a
man qualifies as a father. Part II examines what a person gains as a
matter of constitutional law by being recognized as a parent and what
values this protection of parental rights is supposed to serve. Part III
argues that the Court's test for parenthood supports those values and
shows that, as applied to women, the Court's test supports the gesta-
tional mother's claim. Without delving into every aspect of the debate
over surrogacy contracts, this part also suggests that constitutional
values support the gestational mother's claim even when such a con-
tract exists.
I. WHAT MAKES A MAN A FATHER? MEASURING UP TO MOTHER
The Supreme Court has long counted parental rights among
the rights protected by the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'2 A person deemed by the law to be the parent of a particular
child 3 must receive great deference regarding how that child will be
reared and with whom the child will spend her time. 4 To enforce con-
stitutional rights for parents is to beg the question of who is a parent:
the rights of parenthood would erode if states could deny them merely
by changing the legal definition of parents. 5 The problem of definition
first came to the Court in cases involving unwed fathers. In a series of
cases, the Court created a "biology-plus-relationship" test for fathers'
rights that was modeled on the then-unquestioned rights of mothers.
rights as the claims of women because they are always so. A person of either sex could
theoretically raise the opposing claim to enforce the surrogacy contract.
12. "No state shall... deprive any person of... liberty... without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-66 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
533-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). For a discussion of the
relationship between family privacy, the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the denial of family rights under slavery, see Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images
of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348 (1994). For a discussion
of the content of and reasons for parental rights, see infra Part II.
13. This legal parent may or may not be a biological or adoptive parent. In Prince, the
"parent" who claimed the right to have a child accompany her in distributing religious
literature on the street was the child's aunt and legal guardian. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. But see Emily Buss, "Parental"Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002) (arguing that the
Constitution should afford strong protection to parental authority but allow states
leeway in deciding who is parent); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems
of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999) (cautioning against
excessive constitutionalization of family law).
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A. Biological Fathers'Rights Against the State: Stanley v. Illinois
In the early 1970s, Illinois law defined parents as "the father and
mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural
mother of an illegitimate child."16 This definition excluded the biolog-
ical father of a non-marital child. Peter Stanley, an unwed father who
had lived with and participated in rearing his children, argued that
he was entitled to custody of them after his partner's death, unless
and until the state could prove him an unfit parent. 17 The state re-
sponded that it need do no such thing. In the state's view, he was not
a "parent" at all but a legal stranger to the children; thus, the state
need not prove him unfit before placing the children elsewhere."8
Stanley raised an equal protection challenge: the statute discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex, unfairly treating him, as an unwed father,
differently from an unwed mother.' 9
The Court refused to resolve the case on straight equal protection
grounds,2" grounds that would have required the Court to say that
mothers and fathers were similarly situated parents who happened to
be male or female. The Court had not yet settled on the "intermediate
scrutiny" standard for sex classifications.2' The only sex classification
it had yet struck down was the preference for male rather than fe-
male relatives as estate administrators in Reed v. Reed,22 decided the
year before Stanley. Reed struck down the preference as arbitrary,2"
and no one on the Court had yet proposed a heightened standard.24
To hold that a distinction between mothers and fathers was similarly
arbitrary would have been a difficult next step for the Court.
Instead the Court took a sua sponte detour into both substantive
and procedural due process.2" The Court framed the question before
it as whether Stanley had a procedural due process right to a fitness
hearing before being deprived of custody of the children.26 It there-
fore balanced Stanley's private interest in his relationship with his
16. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, §§
701-14).
17. Id. at 646.
18. Id. at 649-50.
19. Id. at 664-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
21. The intermediate scrutiny standard would come four years later in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
22. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23. Id. at 74.
24. Heightened scrutiny first appeared in a plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
25. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
26. Id. at 649.
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children against the state's interest in avoiding a hearing. It found
Stanley's liberty interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and
management" of the "children he has sired and raised" to be weighty.
28
In contrast, the state's interest in avoiding a fitness hearing was min-
imal and inconsistent with its stated goal of protecting the welfare
of children.29
That much of the Court's ruling, as a matter of procedural due
process, would have entitled Stanley to a hearing with substantial
procedural trappings.3" That much, however, the state was already
willing to provide.3 Stanley could have petitioned for custody of his
children and received a hearing governed by the "best interest of the
child" standard.3 2 In the course of assessing Stanley's private interest,
however, the Court created a different substantive standard: Stanley
not only would receive a hearing but would prevail at the hearing if
the court found him to be a fit parent,33 the standard that governs ter-
minations of parental rights.' The core of Stanley is thus the Court's
recognition that Stanley was, constitutionally, a parent, whose claim
to his children could be overcome only by a compelling state interest,
such as his unfitness.35 After holding that Stanley was entitled to a
fitness hearing as a matter of due process, the Court noted that giving
such a hearing to other parents (married parents and single mothers)
but not to him was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, thereby
technically disposing of the case on the theory Stanley had argued.3
Why the detour into due process instead of a clean equal pro-
tection analysis? The dissent argued, and the majority did not dis-
pute, that equal protection would not suffice because it was eminently
27. Id. at 651-58.
28. Id. at 651.
29. Id. at 657-58.
30. The balancing test that weighs the state's interest against the private interest is
concerned only with the procedural trappings that must attend the state's decision, not
with the decision-making criteria themselves. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976).
31. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648.
32. Id. at 648-49.
33. Id. at 649.
34. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982); see also Hill, supra note 6, at 365.
35. This reading of Stanley suggests that the unfitness standard maybe constitution-
ally required for termination of parental rights. Cf. David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving
the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 782-92 (1999)
(discussing constitutional limits on termination of parental rights).
36. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. Justice Douglas, the fifth vote for a majority that only
needed four (Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate), joined the due process
analysis but rejected the last portion of the opinion, which linked the outcome to Stanley's
equal protection argument. Id. at 659. Much of the Court's analysis treated the statutory
definition of parents as an irrebuttable presumption that unwed fathers were unfit. Soon
thereafter the Court lost interest in irrebuttable presumptions, and this characterization
did not survive in Stanley's progeny.
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reasonable to distinguish between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers.3 ' The dissent offered three reasons, all related to the mother's
role in gestation. First, "[i]n almost all cases, the unwed mother is
readily identifiable, generally from hospital records."3 Second, as
the state argued,
"[It is necessary to impose upon at least one of the parties legal
responsibility for the welfare of [the child], and since necessarily
the female is present at the birth of the child and identifiable as
the mother," the State has selected the unwed mother, rather
than the unwed father, as the biological parent with that legal
responsibility.39
Third,
[O]n the basis of common human experience .... the biological
role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates
stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds re-
sulting from the male's often casual encounter.... Centuries of
human experience buttress this view of the realities of human
conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of illegitimate chil-
dren are generally more dependable protectors of their children
than are unwed fathers.4 °
The majority did not dispute the dissent's characterizations of mothers
and unwed fathers. However, foreshadowing the Court's reasoning in
Craig v. Boren,4 the majority argued that even if unwed fathers were
typically irresponsible toward their children, this stereotype should
not control an individual case.42 Even Stanley based his claim on his
status as "a somewhat unusual unwed father" in that he had "loved,
cared for, and supported these children from the time of their birth
until the death of their mother. 43
37. Id. at 659-68 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 664.
39. Id. at 661 n. 1 (quoting Illinois's brief, alteration in original). Modern feminist
family lawyers seem to agree that this statement remains an accurate generalization,
although unwed fathers are more involved with their children today than the Court
assumed in 1972. See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 111-12 (2003) (giving statistics on paternal contact with children);
Silbaugh, supra note 15, at 1152-53.
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41. 429 U.S. 190, 202 & n. 13 (1976) (rejecting as irrelevant state's evidence that
stereotype was statistically accurate).
42. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654-55. The Court noted that the justification for relying on
generalizations was particularly inadequate in this situation because the state would be
holding a hearing on the children's fate in any event. Id. at 657 n. 9.
43. Id. at 666 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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In retrospect,4 the surprising point about Stanley is that a
father's biological relationship with a child is not sufficient for him
to be deemed a parent, even though biological motherhood is sufficient
for a woman to be deemed a parent. Biology was important for deter-
mining a father's status, but the Court also required a relationship
with the children and a history of caring for them. Only the "unusual"
father who had been deeply involved in parenting became the equal
of a mother, at least when the state tried to remove the child. Later
cases, discussed below, confirmed that a man was constitutionally
entitled to parental rights only if he had actively helped rear his
genetic offspring.
B. Biological Fathers' Rights Against Mothers
The cases that followed Stanley confirmed that the Court was
not prepared to equate fatherhood with motherhood, even after it had
declared sex classifications to be inherently suspect.4" In Stanley the
contest had been between the father and the state after the mother's
death, but in the next case, Quilloin v. Walcott, the contest was be-
tween the father and mother.46 In Quilloin, a unanimous Court re-
buffed the claim of an unwed father of an eleven-year-old child.4 The
mother had married another man, and the father, Leon Quilloin,
sought to block the adoption of the child by the mother's husband.4"
Under Georgia's adoption laws, the unwed mother had the sole power
to consent to adoption of her child.49 At the adoption hearing, the court
asked not whether Quilloin was unfit but whether adoption by the
step-father was in the child's best interests. 0 Unlike in Stanley, both
Quilloin and the Court focused on substantive due process as the doc-
trinal basis for his claim.51
Two strands of reasoning are evident in the sparse, unanimous
opinion rejecting Quilloin's claim. One strand found Quilloin's claim
lacking because his contacts with his child were sporadic.5 2 He had
"never been a de facto member of the child's family" and thus had not
"shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
44. That is, from the perspective of a time of fathers' rights organizations and increased
state efforts to assign at least financial responsibility to biological fathers.
45. Or at least "quasi-suspect." Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325
(1976) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (describing women as a quasi-suspect class).
46. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
47. Id. at 247.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 248 (citing GA. CODE § 74-403(3) (1975)).
50. Id. at 247.
51. Id. at 254-55.
52. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
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supervision, education, protection, or care of the child."5 Although
he had met the biology part of the biology-plus-relationship test,
Quilloin's relationship with the child did not meet the high standard
set by Stanley.
The other strand of the Court's reasoning focused on the alter-
native to recognizing Quilloin as the father: Quilloin was competing
for custody not with the state and its foster care system, as Stanley
had been, but with the more compelling option of the mother and her
husband.54 The Court said that Stanley had left the rights of unwed
fathers "unresolved" in situations where "the countervailing interests
are more substantial."55 Thus, the Court implied that even if Quilloin
had established a relationship with his child, the state's interest in
the child's welfare could overcome his parental claim.
Had Quilloin preserved a claim of sex discrimination, he could
have pointed out that even if he had been deeply involved in rearing
his children, state law would not have let him terminate the mother's
rights in favor of his new wife. Quilloin, however, did not preserve a
sex discrimination claim, and the Court did not consider the issue.56
The issue of sex discrimination was preserved and was decisive
in Caban v. Mohammed,57 decided the year after Quilloin. Caban, like
Quilloin, involved a father trying to block adoption of his children by
the mother's new husband.58 In this case, however, the father and his
new wife also sought to adopt the child.59 The father, Abdiel Caban
was more like Peter Stanley than Leon Quilloin in his involvement
with his children, and the Court sided with him." Moreover, applying
intermediate scrutiny,6 the Court rejected the second rationale on
which it had relied in Quilloin, holding that the State's desire to
legitimate a child born out of wedlock was "not in itself sufficient to
justify the gender-based distinction."62 The Court suggested that a
53. Id. at 253, 256.
54. Id. at 251-53.
55. Id. at 248. This phrase appears to refer to the fact that the state's interest in
Quilloin was to establish the child in the mother's new family, as opposed to removing
the child to the foster system as in Stanley.
56. Id. at 253 n. 13.
57. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. at 389.
61. Intermediate scrutiny, adopted in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (after Stanley
but before Caban), requires the government to show that the suspect classification is
"substantially related" to the accomplishment of an "important" governmental interest.
Id. at 197. It contrasts with strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be "narrowly
tailored" to the accomplishment of a "compelling" governmental interest, and rational basis
review, requiring the classification to be "rationally related" to a "legitimate" govern-
mental interest.
62. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391. This argument may remain available to block an unwed
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distinction between mothers and fathers might be appropriate in
adoptions of newborn infants but not in adoptions of older children
"where the father has established a substantial relationship with the
child and has admitted his paternity."63
A few years later the Court applied the relationship requirement,
almost with a vengeance, in Lehr v. Robertson.64 Jonathan Lehr was
the biological father of a baby whose mother disappeared with the
child shortly after the birth.65 She married another man, and when
the child was just over two years old, the mother and stepfather pe-
titioned for an adoption.66 In the meantime, Lehr had been search-
ing for the child. He hired private investigators and filed a petition
to obtain a declaration of paternity and visitation rights.67 Despite
father's belated challenge to a third-party adoption. In Quilloin, Lehr, Caban, and Michael
H., the unwed fathers sought to be recognized as fathers and presumably wanted visi-
tation, but they did not seek to remove the children from primary custody with their
mothers. The father in Caban would not necessarily have prevailed if he had sought to
undo an adoption and remove the children from the adopted home. Cf. Garrison, supra
note 9, at 896 (asserting that "although an unmarried mother alone cannot block her child's
father from asserting his parental status even if he has long failed to 'act as a father' to
his child, adoptive parents may deprive the father of parental rights if they can make the
same showing'). Nonetheless, many states seem to give unwed fathers more power to undo
third-party adoptions than Caban gave them to block step-parent adoptions. See infra
Part I.D.
Courts may be inclined to apply a more lenient standard for fatherhood if the mother
tries to deny the biological father access to the child without providing a replacement
father to adopt the child. See id. at 896. To constitutionalize that reduced burden would
be wrong. By allowing the mother effectively to prevent the father from meeting the
biology-plus-relationship test, the Court would leave space for mothers and states to
honor different family forms, ranging from families headed by lesbian couples to the
families preferred in avuncular societies, where the primary male figure in a child's life
is the mother's brother.
63. Caban, 441 U.S. at 393. On the same day the Court handed down Caban, it decided
against the unwed father in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), without pausing to
consider the extent of his relationship with the child. In Parham, the child and mother had
died in a car accident. Id. at 349. Georgia law precluded an unwed father from suing for
wrongful death unless he had formally acknowledged the child. Id. A plurality consisting
of the Caban dissenters rejected application of intermediate scrutiny, arguing that a lower
standard applied when women and men were not similarly situated as a matter of biology.
Id. at 355. The deciding vote, however, came from Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion
of the Court in Caban and wrote separately in Parham. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell applied intermediate scrutiny in both cases. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., con-
curring); Caban, 441 U.S. at 382. In Parham, he found an "important" state interest in
correctly identifying the father after the child's death, particularly in light of the facts of
that case, in which the mother had also been killed and thus was not available to testify.
441 U.S. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring). The relatively minor burden to the father of
formally asserting paternity seemed to Justice Powell reasonable in light of the difficulties
of proving paternity. Id. at 360 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
65. Id. at 250.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting). Some commentators have implied that the
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knowing of that petition, the mother, her husband, and the judge
finalized the adoption without giving Lehr notice of the proceeding.68
Notwithstanding his efforts to obtain both the rights and the
responsibilities of parenthood, Lehr lost his case in the Supreme
Court because he had never established an actual, day-to-day family
relationship with his child.69 The Lehr Court endorsed portions the
dissents in Caban, which drew a "clear distinction between a mere
biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental respon-
sibility."'7 Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban had argued that "[p]a-
rental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more endur-
ing."'" Lehr also noted Justice Stewart's observation in Caban that
traditionally, in the context of marriage, a father's rights derive from
his relationship with the mother.72 The Caban dissenters had been
willing to let the mother "place a limit on whatever substantive con-
stitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father's actual
relationship with the children."73 They would have drawn a line be-
tween a father's rights against the state and his rights against the
mother, giving only the former full-blown protection. The majority's
decision in Caban denied mothers this legal veto once a relationship
was established, but Lehr gave unwed mothers at least the chance,
immediately after birth, to exercise a practical, de facto veto over the
father's ability to establish parental rights."4
majority denied these facts. See, e.g., C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court's Family
Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights from Social Science on Family Structures and Kinship
Changes in the U.S., 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 431, 457 nn. 114-15 (2004). Although
the majority did speak dismissively of Lehr's efforts to establish a relationship with the
child, it did not deny Lehr's factual claims (which would have been improper, given the
procedural posture of the case) but ignored those claims as irrelevant given the lack of
an actual relationship with the child. Cf. Spitko, supra note 9, at 124 n. 119.
68. 463 U.S. at 250; id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting). Lehr would have been entitled
to notice of the adoption proceeding if he had listed himself on the state's putative father
registry. Id. at 250-51. However, "[t]he sole purpose of notice [was] to enable the person
served... to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child." Id.
at 252 n. 5 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1977)). Thus Lehr would not
have been able to block the adoption if the judge determined it to be in the child's best
interests, and his parental rights, if any, would have been terminated without any showing
that he was unfit. The presence of a putative father in the proceeding thus required the
court to listen to an argument against the adoption, but it did not alter the substantive
legal standard allowing the adoption to be granted, even over the father's objection.
Nonetheless, many states seem to have taken Lehr as entitling unwed fathers to block
adoptions. See infra Part I.D.
69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-62.
70. Id. at 259-60.
71. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
omitted).
72. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16.
73. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
74. Lehr left unclear whether a biological father is entitled to some form of notice and,
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All of the fatherhood cases assumed that the birth of a child es-
tablishes the mother's rights." The Court held that the father is dif-
ferently situated at the time of birth and that he remains differently
situated unless and until he establishes a caretaking relationship with
the child.76 Once he establishes that relationship, the core right - to
be recognized as a parent to the exclusion of others and to the ex-
clusion of the state's ability to remove the child - is protected as a
matter of sex equality. Setting aside the rightness or wrongness of
the Court's premise that mothers' rights are automatic, the next
section examines how the Court used that premise to confer rights
on fathers.
C. Accommodating Fathers
1. Reproductive Biology as a "Real Difference"
The unwed father cases fall into a larger category of sex discrimi-
nation cases in which the Court invokes biological differences to jus-
tify treating the sexes differently: the "real differences" cases.77 From
Stanley to Lehr and continuing through Nguyen v. INS,7" the Court
if so, what form. Following Justice Stevens's lead, some feminists have objected to an
absolute notice requirement as an invasion of the mother's privacy. See, e.g., Cecily L.
Helms & Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers: An Unwed Mother's Right to
Privacy in Adoption Proceedings, 20 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2005) (describing the possibility
of a woman being required to serve notice by publication to an unknown father, with the
published notice including extensive detail about the woman and the sexual encounter(s)
believed to have resulted in pregnancy). For a pragmatic response to this objection, see
Jeffrey A. Parness, Adoption Notices to Genetic Fathers: No to Scarlet Letters, Yes to Good-
Faith Cooperation, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 63 (2006). Other commentators have directly con-
fronted the assumption that a genetic father has any right to notice if he fails to follow
up on the possibility of pregnancy after sex, or even that he has a right to an opportunity
to form a relationship if he does follow up. See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-line, Best
Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Defining Parentage,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637 (2003) (describing genetic parents' rights in child-rearing).
After Lehr, the Supreme Court refused to hear a case more directly raising the question
of a father's rights when the mother had prevented him from forming a relationship with
the child. In re Doe (Baby Boy Janikova), 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
994 (1994), cited in Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers'Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 74-75, 77-
85 (1995) (arguing that fathers should not have such rights).
75. For readers familiar with the unwed father cases and waiting for the other shoe
to drop, Part I.C discusses Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and Part III.A
addresses Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
76. Even after that point, the state may make some distinctions on the basis of sex,
as in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), discussed supra note 63.
77. See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme
Court, 92 YALE L. J. 913 (1983); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
78. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), discussed infra Part III.A, in which the
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has accepted the premise of a sex difference in parents' bonds with
their children at the time of birth. During the same period, the Court
decided several other "real differences" cases of sex discrimination,
most of which involved female plaintiffs challenging classifications
that favored men. 9 The Court's model of equality in the unwed father
cases was quite different from, and more flexible than, the superficial
model of equality it used in the female-plaintiff cases.
In the classic case of Geduldig v. Aiello," the plaintiff and the dis-
senting Justices argued that excluding pregnancy from a disability
insurance plan for state employees constituted sex discrimination.8 '
They noted that the employee's need for disability benefits and the
impact on the state of giving those benefits were the same regard-
less of whether the disability was caused by pregnancy or by other
medical conditions or procedures, such as "prostatectomies, circum-
cision, hemophilia, and gout," conditions that were covered for men.
8 2
Because men received comprehensive income protection for disability,
the dissent argued that true equality required comparable protection
for women, including coverage of pregnancy-related disability."
The majority, however, saw nothing wrong with this state of af-
fairs. It concluded that the statute was not discriminatory because
men as well as women were denied benefits for pregnancy-related dis-
abilities.' As the Court said, the classification was between "preg-
nant ... and non-pregnant persons, ' 5 as if each were a permanent
category. The Justices did acknowledge that this classification en-
tailed some sex-specificity but threw up their hands in the face of
inequitable biology." Women, said the Court, were saddled by na-
ture with the disproportionate burden of reproduction. This burden
Court explicitly reaffirmed that the biological differences between men and women some-
times justify different legal rules.
79. See Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977); GE v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); see also Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
80. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
81. Id. at 497-505 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Originally, the plan denied coverage for
any pregnancy-related disability. Id. at 490-91. In the course of litigation, California
agreed to extend benefits to disabilities due to complications of pregnancy, leaving at issue
only the denial of benefits for the period of disability associated with normal pregnancy
and delivery. Id.
82. Id. at 501-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the EEOC's agreement with this con-
clusion). Like the majority, the dissent accepted a male baseline, arguing that the plan
should also cover pregnancy because of the coverage it provided to men, rather than be-
cause of its role in many women's lives.
84. Id. at 496-97.
85. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
86. Id. at 494-96 & n.20.
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inherently inhibited their participation in the workforce on equal
terms, as those terms have been set by men. The state had no duty
to make up the difference. The Court's opinion in Geduldig fairly reeks
of Anatole France's paean to "the majestic equality of the laws, which
forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges. ' 7 Women, the
analogous poor in the Court's eyes, are burdened by a biological des-
tiny that hinders their participation in the paid workforce.
The Court's opinions on parental rights are just the reverse:
women who can bear children are rich by virtue of their biology, and
biological mothers, by virtue of having produced their children, have
a facially stronger claim to parental rights.8 " In Geduldig, the Court
let the state define rights by taking men's biology (i.e., men's inabil-
ity to become pregnant) as the norm. s If the Court had used this
accommodation-denying approach in Stanley and Caban, it would
have let the state to define parenthood in a way that only women
could fulfill.9° The Court would have said to the father,
You may be the biological father of these children, but that does
not make you similarly situated to their mother, who grew them
in her body at risk to life and health. The Equal Protection Clause
does not require the state to give equal rights to those who are not
similarly situated. Affirmed.
Of course the unwed father cases did not end that way. The Court
did not end its analysis (as it did in Geduldig) with the observation
that women and men are not similarly situated and therefore need
not be treated similarly. Instead, having identified a relevant biolog-
ical difference between the sexes, the Court took another step: it used
motherhood as the model for crafting the biology-plus-relationship
test to accommodate fathers' physical disadvantage. As the Court
later explained, it makes sense to allow a man to acquire parental
rights comparable to a mother's by creating a test "in terms the male
can fulfill."'"
87. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1910).
88. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 56 (1995).
89. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
90. Cf. Silbaugh, supra note 15, at 1153 (analogizing Geduldig to unequal treatment
of mothers and fathers at the time of birth).
91. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing Congress's effort to give male
citizens means to obtain citizenship for foreign-born children); see Annette Ruth Appell,
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 690-96
(2001) (arguing that "parenthood, as protected by the Constitution, is understood in rela-
tion to the mother" and that gestation and birth are the "paradigm for parenthood"); see
also Shanley, supra note 74, at 88-90 (stating that the model parent is a pregnant woman
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Although Lehr demonstrates that this test is rigorous, the stan-
dard is not as high as it might have been. The Court did not require
the father to show that he had put his physical health at risk for the
child in a manner comparable to the mother's risk; he need not have
rescued the child from a burning house or donated a kidney. Instead,
the test is satisfied by parental behavior that is fairly basic, yet ap-
propriate to the facts of men's biology.92
The Court's accommodation approach acknowledges that men
and women are not similarly situated but asks whether equality re-
quires similar treatment of men and women who have comparable
relationships with their children.93 Furthermore, the accommodation
approach defines what is comparable by using criteria appropriate
to the biology and life experience of both sexes. A woman acquires ini-
tial parental rights' by having biological offspring whom she gestates
and to whom she gives birth; a man acquires similar rights by caring
for his offspring after they are born.95 Thus parental rights, the one
area of law in which men's biology rather than women's is a disadvan-
tage, is also the one area in which the Supreme Court has adopted
a flexible, accommodating theory of sex equality.96
but "different biological roles of men and women in human reproduction make it
imperative that law and public policy 'recognize that a father and mother must be
permitted to demonstrate commitment to their child in different ways"') (quoting Recent
Developments: Family Law - Unwed Fathers' Rights - New York Court of Appeals
Mandates Veto Power Over Newborn's Adoption for Unwed Father Who Demonstrates
Parental Responsibility, 104 HARV. L. REV. 800, 805 (1991)).
92. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1983).
93. This approach is analogous to the theory of "comparable worth" in employment
law, which argues that the Equal Pay Act should require employers to pay equal wages
to women and men not only for the same work but also for comparable work; that is, work
that requires comparable levels of effort, skill, and training, even if it is otherwise quite
different. See generally PAULA ENGLAND, COMPARABLE WORTH: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
(1992). The theory is that the pay disparity between, for example, teenage babysitters
and teenage lawn mowers is due to pervasive sex bias that undervalues the traditional
work of women. Federal courts have generally rejected comparable worth as a theory of
equality under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, and proposed federal legislation has failed.
94. The word acquires here refers to how adults acquire parental rights at the birth
of the child, what Gary Spitko calls being an "initial constitutional parent" (a term he
applies primarily to the biological mother). Spitko, supra note 9. One can also acquire
parental rights through adoption, but even when adoption is planned, initial parental
rights are understood to vest in the birth mother (and father in some cases) and are
transferred to the adoptive parents.
95. Had the Court taken this approach in Geduldig, it could have held not just that
pregnancy should be accommodated on the same terms as other disabilities but that
pregnancy should be accommodated, period. Pregnancy, after all, is not a disease and is
more aptly described as an ability, not a disability. "Pregnancy is part of women's lives
and should be accommodated for that reason, not because it finds a persuasive analogue
in male experience." Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial
Responses to Fetus Envy?, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 127 (1992).
96. The Court's foray into this more flexible approach to sex equality was a limited
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2. The Role of Marriage
The foregoing analysis of the unwed father cases takes the Court
in Caban at its word that the problem was one of sex equality. The
Court fashioned a definition of parental rights for unwed fathers that
accommodated men's biological disadvantage by allowing them to
prove they had made a commitment to parenthood comparable to the
commitment biological motherhood entails. Admittedly, the Court in-
dulged some of the same stereotypes on which the challenged laws
were based. In the end, however, the Court claimed to decide Caban
as a matter of sex discrimination law. If we take the Court at its word,
then its holding is a remarkably flexible and accommodating theory
of equality.
Conservatives and feminists alike have proposed an alternative
reading of the unwed father cases: that these cases are about pro-
tecting the traditional/nuclear/patriarchal family, not promoting sex
equality (cause for praise from conservatives and condemnation from
feminists).97 This reading gives short shrift to the Court's own claim
to be acting in the name of sex equality and leaves feminists without
much doctrine to stand on when arguing for more feminist legal treat-
ment of families.
As a purely doctrinal matter, preference for nuclear families alone
does not explain the unwed father cases.9" The Court grounded Caban
one. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (discussed supra note 63), shows that the
biology-plus-relationship test does not give fathers full-fledged rights equal to those of
mothers. Yet Parham does not deny the father equal rights; it merely permits the state
to impose a different, more burdensome test when the father seeks monetary compensation
for the child's death than when he claims the right to prevent the child's adoption by
another. Id. As the plurality explained in Parham, "It cannot seriously be argued that
a statutory entitlement to sue for the wrongful death of another is itself a 'fundamental'
or constitutional right." Id. at 358 n.12. The requirement that paternity be legally acknowl-
edged is more burdensome in that it requires formal legal action as opposed to every-day
participation in child-rearing. The latter is of course a more significant undertaking, and
a father could, in theory, merely acknowledge paternity without participating in the child's
care. That a father would go to the trouble and expense of initiating formal legal pro-
ceedings in the absence of some meaningful relationship with the child seem unlikely.
97. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion by Justice
Scalia); FINEMAN, supra note 88, at 85; Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions
About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 650 (1993); Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas:
A Case for Cautious Optimism Regarding Procreative Liberty, 25 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
249, 252 (2004); Schultz, supra note 3, at 318; Shanley, supra note 74; Richard F.
Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families
in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527 (2001).
98. Some of the opinions display near horror at the prospect of illegitimacy, which
seems to motivate at least part of the Court's approach. This attitude makes it all the more
significant that the Court was willing to recognize paternal rights even where the father
had not formally acknowledged the child and even where the father was not competing
merely with the mother but with a nuclear family that included the mother and her new
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in equal protection; the Court's own claim to be promoting equality
ought to count for something. Moreover, the majority that made this
claim in Caban included Justices Brennan and Marshall, who had
dissented from Geduldig, while all three Caban dissenters who had
been on the Court five years earlier had joined the majority opinion
in Geduldig.99 It is more plausible that the swing Justices were sym-
pathetic to the accommodation approach only when men's rights were
at stake than that Brennan and Marshall, after siding with women
workers in Geduldig, retreated in Caban to defend the patriarchal
family against the likes of Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens."
One need not agree with Justices Brennan and Marshall that
their approach was best for sex equality and/or for women, 01 but if
the Court claims to be talking about sex equality and the cases will
bear that reading, then equality should be understood as the core
constitutional concern. The unwed father cases do support the equal-
ity reading, and their approach to equality as accommodation of dif-
ference, rather than equality as sameness, could make them valuable
to feminists.
Some of the Court's reasoning in Caban and Stanley may ap-
pear to be based on a nuclear family preference because the Court
compared the actions of the unwed fathers to the actions of married
fathers.0 2 Indeed, the Court said married fathers were presumed to
husband. Indeed, to the extent that the increase in the rights of unwed fathers accom-
plished a decrease in the rights of unwed mothers, unwed mothers are fortunate that the
cases arose on those facts: if a still-single mother had been seeking to cut off the rights
of the father based on his lack of relationship with the child, it is easy to imagine the Court
constructing a much lower hurdle.
The Court's horror of illegitimacy is ironic in light of its later holdings that classifi-
cations based on legitimacy are themselves quasi-suspect. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). The Court appears not to have considered that its
own enshrinement of the importance of legitimacy could perpetuate the stigma against
the children themselves.
99. The Caban dissenters were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist,
and Stevens. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in Geduldig, which the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens had not yet replaced Justice Douglas,
who dissented in Geduldig. Justices Brennan's and Marshall's votes were consistent in
the two cases, as were the opposing votes of Justices Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist.
The three votes that made the difference were those of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
White, who rejected the female plaintiffs' claims in Geduldig but nonetheless used the
Equal Protection Clause to protect the father's rights in Caban.
100. Inclusion on this list may not be entirely fair to Justice Stevens, whose opinion
in Michael H. was driven in part by deference to the mother, similar to the approach of
some feminists. See infra notes 126-31.
101. For example, Part III argues that one important aspect of the approach taken by
Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Nguyen v. INS (joined by Justice Ginsburg and others)
is bad for women because it embraces the narrow conception of equality that produced
Geduldig.
102. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
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have satisfied the relationship prong of the biology-plus-relationship
test."3 The Court, however, rejected the equal protection claim in
Quilloin, which compared married and unmarried fathers, but ac-
cepted the equal protection claim in Caban, which compared mothers
and fathers.'04 The Court's discussion of married fathers served not as
a model for creating the biology-plus-relationship test but as a justifi-
cation for the distinction between married and unmarried fathers.'
As a matter of doctrine, the Court did not hold that unwed fathers
were protected when and because they were similar to married
fathers; they were protected when and because they were similar to
biological mothers.
Nor did the Court's criteria for fatherhood endorse traditional
gender roles: the Court did not define fatherhood in terms of financial
support. Instead it focused on "the daily supervision, education, pro-
tection, [and] care of the child,""' activities that are stereotypically
maternal. The Court's description of what counts as a parental rela-
tionship fit remarkably well with those of feminist and child-centered
scholars who argue for re-conceiving family law under a model that
promotes and rewards "fathering" in the sense of caretaking, not
merely begetting.0 7
In addition to rewarding unwed fathers based on non-traditional
criteria, the Caban Court applied those criteria to protect the biolog-
ical father at the expense of a nuclear family.' Some commentators
have suggested that the Court's decision turned on the fact that the
father had previously lived with the mother and children. 109 Though
unwed, perhaps the couple still qualified as a nuclear family entitled
to protection under a patriarchal view of men's rights. According to
the Court, however, the main factor was the father's connection to the
children."0 Most involved and connected fathers are likely to look
somewhat "traditional" by virtue of having had physical custody of the
child at some point; isolated visits are not likely to involve a parent
654-55 (1972).
103. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
104. Id.; Caban, 441 U.S. at 382 (1979).
105. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and
Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1330 (2005); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1747, 1757 (1993) (advocating a theory of gestational fathering as part of an overall
"generist" perspective on parenting).
108. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
109. Laura Oren, Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of
Motherhood, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 187, 194 (2006).
110. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 393.
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deeply in the child's care."' The fact that in Caban and Stanley the
father's prior custody had been shared with the mother does not mean
that these fathers were protected only because they had lived with
the mother. One could not cite Caban and Stanley as authority for
denying the claim of a father who had lived with and cared for the
children separately from the mother rather than as a nuclear family.
If anything, restricting parental rights to those fathers who have
lived "as a family" with the children allows the mother to retain more
control over the father's ability to establish parental rights at all." 2
The Court's emphasis on cohabitation between father and child seems
driven more by its interest in daily caretaking than by loyalty to the
nuclear family.
When Justice Scalia sought to enshrine a clear nuclear family
preference in an opinion of the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.," 3
he marshaled only four votes. His plurality opinion proposed that an
unwed father's claim should not disrupt an already-established nu-
clear family." 4 Justice Stevens, however, cast the deciding fifth vote
on a theory that recognized at least some rights in the unwed father
that would disrupt the mother's pre-existing nuclear family." 5
The case arose out of Michael's affair with Carole, who was mar-
ried to Gerald.' Carole's daughter, Victoria, was born from the affair
but was initially treated as a child of the marriage."' When Carole
left Gerald to live with Michael, blood tests showed that Victoria was
Michael's child."' Carole took a few years to choose between the two
men, going back and forth in the meantime."9 During a reunion with
Gerald, Michael sued for the right to visit Victoria." 0 He challenged
111. Cf. Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy
by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1564 (1998) ("Parents transmit values not
so much by what they say, but by what they do, how they live, and how they interact
with others.").
112. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 88. These decisions do enforce the "sexual
family" by treating fathers, and only fathers, as eligible for parental rights to the child
of an unwed mother. The Court has never come close to questioning marriage as a central
organizing principle of society. To the extent the unwed mother retains control of the child,
she remains at least somewhat free to honor other traditions, such as giving a more
prominent role to grandparents or treating one of her brothers as the important male
figure in the child's life. Recognizing an unwed father's rights does reduce the mother's
ability to make these other choices and further entrenches the sexual relationship between
the two adults as the core of a family.
113. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
114. Id. at 130.
115. Id. at 132-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 113-14.
118. Id. at 114.
119. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
120. Id.
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California's "presumption of legitimacy," which barred him from being
recognized as Victoria's father unless either Gerald or Carole joined
him in seeking acknowledgement of his paternity.121 As in Quilloin,
Michael argued both due process and equal protection claims, but the
Court refused to consider equal protection because he had not raised
it in the lower courts.
122
The Court's resolution of the case sidestepped the question of
fatherhood in two ways. First, the Court refused to consider that
question directly. The Court's task, it said, was not to issue an ab-
stract declaration of paternity but to determine the standard, if any,
under which Michael could demand visitation.
123
Second, Justice Stevens's concurrence in the judgment dra-
matically limited the import of the Court's ruling for Gerald. Justice
Scalia's plurality would have enforced the California law with no ca-
veats, flatly denying Michael's relevance to Victoria's family. Justice
Stevens voted with the plurality only because the state let Michael
petition for visitation under the best interests of the child standard. 124
Moreover, Michael's right to bring such a petition was not limited in
time.'25 Thus, even though the plurality favored California's presump-
tion of legitimacy, Justice Stevens's rationale left Michael with the
right to petition for visitation, regardless of whether he could be de-
clared "the father."'126 Justice Scalia's effort to solidify the husband's
121. Id. at 115. The law thus accomplished what was, in effect, an automatic adoption
by the mother's husband, as long as he and the mother did not object.
122. Id. at 116-17 (plurality opinion). An equal protection approach would have required
the Court to confront the reality that it is much easier to maintain the legal fiction that
a woman's husband is always the father of her child than to maintain a legal fiction that
a man's wife is always the mother of his. Eliminating the sex classification from this statute
would require the Court to recognize the possibility of a child's having more than one
parent of each sex. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting
the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006);
Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and
the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 272-73 (2003) (noting
that calling California's rule a "presumption of legitimacy" masks the fact that the law
is substituting a social father for a biological one).
123. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126 (plurality opinion); id. at 132-33 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
124. Id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Appell, supra note 91, at 693 ("A majority
of the Court [Justice Stevens plus the dissenters] ... would have recognized at least a
right of the biological father to visit the child.").
125. Id. at 133.
126. The other unwed father cases do not specifically address whether an unwed father
who satisfied the "biology-plus-relationship" test merely had the right to maintain that
relationship through some sort of visitation, or whether they must be allowed to seek
custody on the same terms as unwed mothers and divorced parents. In practice, unwed
fathers have received the benefit of the same sex-neutral custody standards that apply
to divorced parents. The California statute on which Justice Stevens based his resolution
of the case allowed any person to petition for visitation in the child's best interest and
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rights and the primacy of the nuclear family thus fell one vote short
because of Justice Stevens's desire to defer to the mother and to pre-
serve some protection for the adulterous genetic father.
127
Even in Michael H., then, the unwed father had a right to main-
tain some sort of relationship with his child, as long as doing so was
in the child's best interest. 128 But in Michael H., as in all the unwed
father cases, that right depended on the father having established
a meaningful relationship with the child before seeking help from
the courts. The mother was thus implicitly recognized as the "initial
'constitutional parent,"'"29 and the biological father's ability to attain
parental rights depended on her cooperation.
3. A Fork in the Road
The Court's starting point in the unwed father cases was the
premise of a real difference between biological motherhood and bio-
logical fatherhood, a premise that is intuitively justified even if some-
times exaggerated. Because of that real difference, the Court could
have flatly rejected the equal protection claims of unwed fathers and
refused to give men a way to acquire parental rights. 3 ° Or it could
was thus similar to the third-party visitation statute struck down as applied in Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000), discussed infra Part II.A. Although Troxel suggested
that broad third-party visitation statutes are invalid, some form of third-party visitation
statute may be permissible and indeed may be required in situations like Michael H. See
infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
127. See Silbaugh, supra note 15, at 1157 n. 96 (giving references to literature on Justice
Stevens's jurisprudence of parental sex differences). Justice Stevens was apparently willing
to let stand the trial court's ruling that visitation was not in Victoria's best interest, based
on a preference for the mother and the nuclear family. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues
that the better question to ask in Michael H. was whether having "two daddies" was good
or bad and points to evidence that Michael did not, in fact, have an established parenting
relationship with Victoria. Woodhouse, supra note 107, at 1857, 1864-65 (quoting Victoria's
description of Michael as "the crazy man from California who thinks he's my father"). In
fact that is the question the trial court asked, and, like Justice Scalia, it found categorically
that having two daddies would be bad. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115-16, 120. Telling a court
to ask that question may not be all that different from telling it to decide whether it is
good or bad for a white child in a racist society to have a black step-father, a question that
courts have no business asking after Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). The question
of whether Michael had established a true parenting relationship with Victoria is a more
objective question and is the factual question on which the case would have turned on
remand if the dissent had prevailed. For that reason, Woodhouse's critique of the dissent
as exalting genetics over functional parenting seems unfair. One should also note that
the Michael H. dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) all joined the Court's
opinion denying the genetic father's claim in Quilloin. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 112; Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
128. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 135-36.
129. Spitko, supra note 9, at 99.
130. Although the fathers still could have argued a due process liberty claim, the
trigger for men's liberty right is defined by the accommodating equal protection approach
of Caban. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). The rights of unwed fathers thus
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have insisted on a sameness-oriented model of equality that ignored
any uniquely female experience and defined parenthood as genetic
contribution, giving biological fathers equal rights with biological
mothers. The Court's accommodation approach to equality is prefer-
able to either of these extremes."3 '
The first extreme, denying any rights to unwed biological fathers,
would have left unwed mothers with more control over their children:
by avoiding marriage, they could keep exclusive parental rights to the
point of being able to cut off even established relationships between
children and fathers.'32 Courts would deem women not merely the
archetypal but the sole holders of constitutionally grounded paren-
tal rights.'33 That approach is tempting in light of how some men use
parental rights to control women.3 4 In the long run, however, women
lose more than they gain if men are cut off from parental rights by a
sterile and "surface-hugging"1 5 theory of equality.3 6 To the contrary,
the hypocrisy of using a generous vision of equality to protect men's
rights in Stanley and Caban but a stingy vision of equality to reject
women's claims in Geduldig is yet another reason to re-visit Geduldig
and other cases of the Court's willful blindness to inequality rooted
in difference.
Worse than cutting back fathers' rights to protect mothers' pre-
rogatives would be what we are seeing now: reversion to the other ex-
treme, a sameness model of equality that strengthens fathers' rights
by defining their experience, rather than mothers' experiences, as the
baseline.'37 State law responses to Lehr have reverted to that model,
which also appears in the Supreme Court's decision in Nguyen v. INS
and in some approaches to problems involving reproductive technology.
follow a familiar pattern in which "traditional" rights are recognized under the Liberty
Clause and then expanded through the lever of Equal Protection. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (using the Equal Protection Clause to extend to unmarried
couples the right to use contraception recognized for married couples in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); but see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(relying directly on the Liberty Clause to extend sexual privacy rights).
131. For a review of the pros and cons of these two extremes, see Deborah L. Forman,
Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967,
978-1000 (1994).
132. Id. at 981-82.
133. Id.
134. See Baker, supra note 111, at 1568; Davis, supra note 39, at 101 (discussing femi-
nists' reluctance to challenge the notion that women have a special connection to children).
135. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 294 (2001) (characterizing the Rehnquist Court's
approach to the Equal Protection Clause).
136. See Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters: The Neutered Mother, The
Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies by Martha Albertson Fineman,
18 CARDOZo L. REV. 1495, 1514-19 (1997) (book review).
137. See Helms & Spence, supra note 74, at 6.
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On first reading, Lehr appears to be a defeat for fathers' rights:
Lehr was a sympathetic father trying to connect to his child, and the
Court harshly rejected his claim, largely due to alleged deception by
the mother.138 In the course of dismissing Lehr's efforts, however, the
Court spoke favorably of the state's "putative father registry," through
which Lehr could have received notice of the adoption proceeding.139
New York's registry did not actually promise parental rights, only
an opportunity to appear at the adoption hearing.14° Nonetheless,
whether from an over-reading of the Court's endorsement of the regis-
try or out of sympathy for men in Lehr's position, states have largely
treated Lehr as establishing an unwed father's right to notice of adop-
tion proceedings.141 The right to notice has in turn become conflated
with the right to block the adoption if the father wishes to claim pa-
rental rights, regardless of whether he has an existing relationship
with the child.'42
In addition to being an unnecessary over-reading of Lehr, this so-
licitude for the rights of biological fathers has had tragic results. In
two high-profile cases in the 1990s, "Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard"
were taken from their adoptive homes and returned to their biolog-
ical parents at the ages of two and four, respectively, based on lack of
proper notice to biological fathers who did not know the children be-
fore initiating litigation.143 Such outcomes reinforce the notion that
138. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,250-52 (1983). Mary Shanley notes that mothers
may have good reasons for hiding pregnancy from, for example, an abusive father. She
argues that to the extent the unwed father has a right to block an adoption, the mother
should at least be heard on why she does not want the father to have custody, "recognizing
that her decision not to retain her custodial rights is not an abandonment of her interest
in the child, but an extension of her efforts to care for her offspring." Shanley, supra note
74, at 77-78.
139. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264-65.
140. Id. at 251; see supra note 68; Helms & Spence, supra note 74, at 22-23; Parness,
supra note 74, at 64-67; see also Spitko, supra note 9, at 110 (arguing that father must
make a substantial showing before acquiring rights, usually impossible before birth).
141. Rebecca Aizpuru, Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parents: A Survey
of Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 REv. LIrTG. 703, 715 (1999).
142. See June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core
of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1322 (2005) ("[M]any states now confer parental
status on the basis of biology alone."); see also Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the
Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 468 ("[U]nder the statutes and
case law of many states, custodial claims of unwed fathers are protected to a far greater
extent than the Supreme Court has said is constitutionally necessary, even when this pro-
tection comes at the price of disrupting functional, but not biologically related, families.").
143. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995) (Richard); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239
(Iowa 1992) (Jessica). David Meyer narrates a heart-wrenching account of the ultimate
transfer of custody from Richard's point of view. Meyer, supra note 35, at 753. In both
cases, the litigation was in fact initiated by the mother, who regretted the adoption
decision. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 327; In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241. Both cases
may have been avoided if the waiting periods for adoption in this country were similar
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biological fathers "own" their offspring regardless of whether they
have functioned as parents and regardless of the reality of the child's
life. They also lead in the direction of equating parenthood with ge-
netics, with gestation and other nurturance dismissed as fungible
child care services.
While the states have strengthened the rights of unwed biological
fathers, the Supreme Court has shifted toward a genetically oriented
definition of parenthood less from a desire to embrace fathers' rights
than from fear of being accused of stereotyping women as mothers.
The Court's shift, discussed in Part III, contributes to a climate that
favors enforcing surrogacy contracts. Evaluating this trend in light of
the Court's existing jurisprudence of parenthood requires examination
of the principles that guide existing law: that is, why parental rights
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in the first place.
Because the Court created the biology-plus-relationship test to
accommodate fathers by comparing them to mothers, the relationship
requirement shows that the Court saw mothers as inherently having
relationships with their children. The relationship requirement also
suggests that, in the unwed father cases, the Court saw itself as pro-
tecting the emotional bond between parent and child. Part II exam-
ines the Court's protection of this bond and identifies the interests
that the Court tries to serve by protecting parental rights.
II. WHY PROTECT PARENTHOOD? THE RIGHT AND ITS
JUSTIFICATIONS
If parenthood were determined by a simple, mechanical formula
like genetics or contractual intent, it would be easy to apply the same
formula to new situations made possible by reproductive technology.
The Court's definition of parenthood is not so mechanical. It contains
implicit assumptions about motherhood but is flexible enough to ac-
commodate parents, like fathers, with a different biological relation-
ship to the child. Extending that definition to new biological possibili-
ties requires us to examine why the Court has chosen this definition
of parenthood and what values the definition serves."'
to those in Europe and Australia. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws
Governing Mothers' Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV.
509, 516-18, 541-48 (2005) (reporting that U.S. laws make consent to adoption irrevocable
in a few days to two weeks, while most European countries and Australian states allow
approximately six weeks).
144. To continue the analogy suggested in note 92, courts rejected the comparable worth
theory of equality in employment law partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding
when two very different jobs were "comparable" in terms of skill, effort, and other relevant
factors. In the reproductive context, Marjorie Schultz argues that accommodation of men
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As a starting point, the result in Michael H. raises the question
of what it means to be a parent as a matter of constitutional law.
After the Michael H. decision, Gerald and Carole remained Victoria's
parents under California law, but Michael had the right to petition
for visitation based solely on a judge's assessment of Victoria's best
interests. Does that mean Michael is a parent, too?
Second, what is the Court protecting when it protects parental
rights? In the unwed father cases, the Court held that, as far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, a man has little, if any, pre-
sumptive bond with his newborn genetic offspring. Some recent opin-
ions suggest (contrary to the implicit premise of the unwed father
cases) that the same is true of women.'45 If the bond between parent
and child were the only reason for protecting parental rights, and if
no bond existed with either mother or father at the child's birth, no
constitutional bar would prevent the state from seizing newborns and
distributing them to parents by some administrative scheme.'46
The bond between parent and child is not the only reason for pro-
tecting parental rights as a matter of constitutional law. The rights
of biological parents are also protected precisely to prevent the state
from distributing babies according to its own standards. Constitu-
tional protection of parental rights serves the structural need to mini-
mize the state's discretion in distributing children, and with them the
power to control the education and socialization of the next generation.
Fourteenth Amendment parental rights aim at both these concerns:
the emotional bond between parent and child and the parent's right
to control the upbringing of the child.147 The biology-plus-relationship
test accords with these justifications for protecting parental rights
as a matter of constitutional law.
via reproductive technology is a necessary complement to feminist demands for accom-
modation of pregnancy in the workplace. Schultz, supra note 3, at 303, 385. I agree with
Schultz that courts should accommodate men's reproductive disadvantage, but the biology-
plus-relationship test is sufficient. In light of the role parental rights play in constitutional
law and in children's lives, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to minimize the impor-
tance of gestation for the sake of a "gender neutral" criterion such as genetics or intent.
A few voices have called for accommodation in the form of a "male right to abortion"
(meaning a biological father's right not to pay child support if the mother refuses to have
an abortion). See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future
of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 1, 47-48 (2004); see
also Dubay v. Wells, No. 06-11016-BC, 2006 WL 1983210, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 17,2006).
To the extent that these arguments are based on analogy to a woman's right to abortion,
they misapprehend the nature of the abortion right.
145. See infra Part III.A (discussing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)). On the issue
of the nature and quality of the mother-child bond, see Lucy Jane Lang, To Love the
Babe That Milks Me: Infanticide and Reconceiving the Mother, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 114 (2005).
146. See Appell, supra note 91, at 709-10 (speculating about possible administrative
schemes).
147. See Denise A. Skinner & Julie K. Kohler, Parental Rights in Diverse Family
Contexts: Current Legal Developments, 51 FAM. REL. 293, 293-94 (2002).
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A. The Constitutional Meaning of Parenthood
What did Peter Stanley and Abdiel Caban gain by winning their
cases and being recognized as parents? The rights of parents have
been described as including the "right to the care, custody and com-
panionship of [the] child as well as the right to make decisions affect-
ing the welfare of the child free from government interference, except
in compelling circumstances."'48 The Supreme Court's early parental
rights cases protected a motley assortment of rights, mostly related
to control over the child's education.'49 More comprehensive, but in
the end surprisingly narrow, was the Court's affirmation of parental
rights in Troxel v. Granville.5 ° Despite the narrowness of the holding,
Troxel runs counter to the protection for unwed fathers carved out
by Justice Stevens's opinion in Michael H.' 5'
Troxel struck down a Washington trial court's application of a
third-party visitation statute. Under the authority of that statute,
the court had ordered more frequent visits with the children's grand-
parents than the mother preferred." 2 The substantive standard gov-
erning the trial court's decision was the best interests of the children,
the same standard that applied to Michael's petition for visitation in
Michael H.' The Court's six opinions left a great deal of uncertainty
for states that want to allow non-parental visitation orders.' They
also revealed that the Court holds to a surprisingly weak theory of
parental rights.
Despite commonly being called a "grandparent" visitation law,
the third-party visitation statute at issue in Troxel actually allowed
anyone to petition a court for a visitation order.' 5 The order could
issue based solely on a finding that visitation would be in the best in-
terests of the child."S The statute thus authorized sweeping intrusions
on parental rights. The plurality opinion condemned the breadth of
the statute, but the Court declared it unconstitutional only as applied
148. Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REV. 405,
406 (1988); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (describing "the interest of
the parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children").
149. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-66 (1944); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
150. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
151. Compare id. with Michael H. V. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
152. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61.
153. Id. at 61; Michael H., 491 U.S. at 134-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. See generally Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 279 (2000); Janet Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter:
A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 394 (2002).
155. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
156. Id. at 63.
2007]
456 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:429
in Troxel itself.'57 Although the micromanaging of the mother in
Troxel was particularly egregious, the third parties seeking visitation
were sympathetic. They were, after all, the children's biological grand-
parents. Their son, the father, had died, and they sought the visi-
tation order after finding their contacts with his children reduced as
the mother moved on with her life.'58 It is hard to imagine a better
case for third-party visitation than the claims of these particular
grandparents.'59 One can thus safely assume that whatever right
the mother had against these grandparents, she has the same right
against the rest of the world.
That right appears to be mainly the right to have one's views
about what is in the child's best interests consulted first and pre-
sumptively last, hardly a robust presumption. Troxel holds that the
state cannot override the parent's decisions based solely on a dif-
ference of opinion between judge and parent about the child's best
interests."6 At the same time, Troxel leaves open doors for state inter-
vention that make parental rights appear surprisingly weak. The
Court refused to declare the third-party visitation statute unconsti-
tutional on its face, and the plurality opinion suggested that a similar
statute would be acceptable if it merely gave some "special weight"
to the parent's wishes.' 6 ' The mother in Troxel appears only to have
had contingent authority over her children's daily affairs. Were she,
for example, to cut off all contact with the grandparents, the grand-
parents could still win a visitation order if they could convince a trial
court that the mother's decision hurt the children. The grandparents
would not need to prove her unfit.'6 2
The narrow parental rights recognized in Troxel are of course
the same rights the unwed fathers gained by being recognized as
fathers in Stanley and Caban. In Stanley, as in Troxel, the other
parent's death meant that recognition as a parent conferred exclu-
sive parental rights, but in Caban the father gained only the right
157. Id. at 73.
158. Id. at 60-61.
159. Except perhaps for Michael H., discussed in Part I.C.
160. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
161. Id. at 69.
162. See generally David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and
Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1140 (noting that the mother in Troxel won narrowly).
Perhaps after Troxel the standard for intervention ultimately will become something
akin to "arbitrary and capricious," the standard applied in other contexts where courts
review decisions committed to the discretion of a unit of government. Finding a home for
children's rights against their parents through analogy from the family to administrative
agencies would recognize the family as the unofficial third level of governance in our
system, a fitting approach for the current Court. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans
Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future - Or Reveal the
Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 159-60 (1999).
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to be and to remain a more or less equal contender with the mother
on questions of the child's best interests.
163
These are also the same rights that Carole and Gerald retained
when the Supreme Court let stand California's presumption of
Gerald's paternity. 16 4 In their case however, parental rights were ex-
pressly conditioned, by Justice Stevens's concurrence, on Michael's
ability to seek visitation based on Victoria's best interests. 165 That
resolution is precisely what Troxel forbids: a judge overriding the
wishes of the legal parents based solely on the judge's assessment
of the child's best interests. Troxel thus either modifies or contains
an exception for Michael H.
166
One could modify Michael H. to be consistent with Troxel with-
out jettisoning Justice Stevens's opinion in favor of the plurality
opinion. The simplest modification would be to raise the standard
Michael would have to meet to obtain visitation. Instead of 'Michael
is entitled to any visitation that is in Victoria's best interests," the
standard would be "Michael is entitled to visitation if the lack of visi-
tation would harm Victoria." Michael would thus stand in the same
position as the Troxel grandparents and all other third parties, with
the important caveat that states would be required, not merely per-
mitted, to allow for visitation by non-legal fathers who satisfy the
biology-plus-relationship test.'67
Alternatively, one could leave the resolution of Michael H. intact
and treat it as an exception to Troxel. The rule would be that on ques-
tions of custody and visitation, judges cannot override legal parents
without a showing of harm to the child, except that they may apply
a best interests standard when a man who would otherwise have
rights as the child's father is excluded from that status by a marital
presumption of paternity.
68
163. The ongoing right to make such decisions is the difference between Caban and
Quilloin. Quilloin was given the opportunity to be heard on whether the adoption by the
mother's husband was in the child's best interest. If it were, Quilloin would be cut off
from all future decisions and any right to visitation. 434 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1977). Al-
though Caban raised the specific issue of the unwed father's right to block adoption of
the child by a step-father, the opinion condemns the gender-based scheme and makes
clear that the unwed mother and father should be treated as equal parents for purposes
of custody decisions.
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1988).
165. Id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. In Troxel, Justice Stevens recognized this tension when he relied on the unwed
father cases to support the proposition that states can mandate visitation with a non-
parent. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 87-90 (2000).
167. This discussion assumes that Michael could have satisfied the relationship prong
of the biology-plus-relationship test, an issue that would have been addressed on remand
if Michael had prevailed. See Woodhouse, supra note 107, at 1864-65.
168. This approach would not preclude the possibility that courts could accord a similar
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Either way, Troxel highlights the fact that Michael H. created
a constitutional status that can only be described as that of a quasi-
parent: a person not a legal parent who nonetheless has greater
rights in a contest with the legal parent than does any other third
party. Michael attained that status by being a biological father who
(allegedly) established a parenting relationship with his offspring.
Whether one thinks the law should preserve or eliminate Michael's
quasi-parental status depends in part on what interests one thinks
the Court is protecting when it protects parental rights, and what it
means to protect those interests equally for men and women.
B. Constitutional Justifications for Parental Rights
Why are parental rights protected as a matter of constitutional
law? The biology-plus-relationship test explicitly defines the rights
of unwed fathers and implicitly recognizes those of mothers (and, to
a lesser extent, those of married fathers). This test accords with the
justifications given in earlier cases for protecting parental rights in
the first place: protecting emotional bonds between parents and chil-
dren and ensuring the non-state-controlled distribution of children.
In particular, the relationship prong protects emotional bonds while
the biology prong serves the political purpose.'69
1. The Concrete Connection Between Parent and Child
The unwed father cases focused on the caretaking relationship
between the father and the child. The Court's concern was the most
intuitive reason for protecting parental rights: the concrete, particu-
larized emotional bond between each parent and child, as individuals.
The prospect of a child being torn from her parent is the sort of "heart-
crushing blow to the pursuit of happiness"'7 ° that can send even the
most conservative judge looking for a constitutional text on which to
status to other contenders for quasi-parental status, such as birth parents in cases of
botched adoptions (see Meyer, supra note 35, at 813-14 (proposing that the law let the
adoption stand but allow for visitation by the birth parents)), and partners of legal parents
who become functional parents in the absence of a biological tie. See Spitko, supra note
9, at 132 (proposing that a caretaker who assumes an explicitly parental role, with the
consent of the existing legal parent(s), should be deemed a legal parent).
169. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
170. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 105 (1997) (proposing the quoted language as a test for violation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing
parental rights as 'long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men").
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hang reversal.'71 The interest in this emotional bond was poignantly
illustrated by the desire of the child in Quilloin to be adopted by his
stepfather and to continue visitation with his biological father.'72 Be-
fore the unwed father cases, states operated on the assumption that
only women formed such bonds with children. The Court rejected
this stereotype and said that men too can form emotional bonds with
their children.1
73
The protection of parental rights in Caban, however, was trig-
gered by a history of day-to-day caretaking, not by a showing of actual
emotional attachment. 174 In other words, the biology-plus-relationship
test analogized to what, in the Court's eyes, mothers do, not what
mothers feel.175 The Court did not ask whether Caban changed dia-
pers resentfully or joyfully, only whether he changed them.'76 Paren-
tal rights attach because the parent assumes responsibility, not purely
as a balm for the heart. 7 7 This justification for parental rights is thus
a concrete connection rather than, say, love. The Court's decisions in
the unwed father cases did not turn on subjective inquiries into the
father's (or child's) emotions, but the relationship prong of the test
embodies Court's solicitude for their existing bond. 78 Parental rights
171. In Troxel, Justice Scalia voiced his objection to the enterprise of substantive due
process yet indicated his willingness to find protection for parent-child relationships in the
First Amendment's (non-textual) freedom of association. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 93 n.2 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 & n.11 (1977).
173. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
174. 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
175. As noted above, the Court has not clarified what would pass as the "bare minimum"
for claiming parental rights under the biology-plus-relationship test, but its decisions
emphasize daily caretaking responsibilities over more stereotypically male parenting
such as giving gifts or providing financial support. Although the absence of financial sup-
port was counted against the father in Quilloin, money went unmentioned in Caban, and
the Court was unconcerned by the financial motive for custody in Stanley. Caban, 441 U.S.
380; Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
176. The reference to diapers is illustrative. The children in Caban were old enough that
diapers did not enter into the discussion. On nurturing as the essence of legal fatherhood,
see generally Dowd, supra note 107, at 1275. The emphasis on presence rather than on
the performance of specified tasks also leaves room for recognizing families with diverse
views of gender roles. See infra note 183.
177. Protection of this emotional bond can also be explained instrumentally, on the
theory that an adult who knows the child well is likely to make good decisions on the
child's behalf. See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child, and
the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 31 (comparing the relative expertise of parents and
states with respect to the unique needs of a particular child).
178. The Court's emphasis on the caretaking bond was so strong that it encouraged
a flowering of arguments (to date unsuccessful) for recognizing parental rights in non-
biologically related caregivers, from foster parents to the romantic partners of biological
parents. Although Troxel reaffirmed the primacy of the biological parent, it left a wide
opening for states to recognize "social parents" when necessary to prevent harm to the
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000). The Supreme Court is unlikely either
to require or to forbid recognition of such parents as a matter of constitutional law.
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were earned by conduct that is reasonably assumed to give rise to an
emotional bond. 179
Interests other than emotions may also be protected by honoring
a caretaking bond. The best interests of the child may be served by
committing her future care to a person with a track record of willing-
ness to provide that care. iso In the unwed father cases, however, the
Court evinced concern primarily for the emotional connection pre-
sumed to arise from caretaking. Caban, after all, involved no shortage
of parents willing and demonstrably able to care for the child.'' Alter-
natively, the fact that the parent has labored to rear the child may in-
tensify the sense that the child is the property of the parent. Although
notions of property rights may contribute to an adult's sense of en-
titlement to a child, and thus to the emotional harm of removing the
child, a property right in a child seems an unlikely candidate as a
constitutionaljustification for parental rights."2 Moreover, the most
traditional conception of the child as property was the father's author-
ity over both his wife and her children, regardless of whether the
children were "his" biologically or whether he had assisted in their
care. '3 By requiring caretaking, the biology-plus-relationship test
179. The care-based relationship requirement thus serves as a decision rule, or reason-
able proxy, for implementing an underlying principle that is much more difficult to mea-
sure. Although expert witnesses will always be available to testify about whether a child
has "bonded" with a particular adult, it seems preferable to rely on data that are not
filtered through the biases of such experts.
180. For cases in which this is not so, Stanley made clear that the standard for removing
the child is the unfitness of the parent. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-50 (1972).
Initial identification of the legal parent is a distinct question from the termination of
parental rights. Avoiding the latter requires only fitness.
181. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 384 (1979).
182. In considering what the justifications for parental rights tell us about how to apply
existing doctrine to new facts, we should focus on the openly admitted reasons for pro-
tecting those rights. Although a critic may point out that the Court's decisions serve other
interests, that is an argument either for confessing a different goal than previously stated
or for changing the law, not for continuing to develop it in a direction that serves an un-
acknowledged and illegitimate goal.
183. This model arguably survives in the fact that only unwed fathers have to satisfy
the biology-plus-relationship requirement to establish their parental rights. In Quilloin,
the Court justified this distinction by arguing that it was reasonable to assume that a
married father who lived in the same household as the children was involved in their day-
to-day care. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978). Gary Spitko has reconciled the
differing treatment of married and unmarried fathers by theorizing marriage as clear
consent by the mother to share parenting with her husband. Spitko, supra note 9, at 114.
The political theory of parental rights discussed below would offer another justification
for this distinction. Suppose for example that a traditionally minded couple marries and
has children. The mother does virtually all of the day-to-day caretaking, and the father
provides financial support. If he were sufficiently uninvolved with the children, he might
arguably fail to meet the biology-plus-relationship test, yet to deny him parental status
would amount to declaring that this family form, and its gender-based assignment of roles,
was invalid. Cf. Appell, supra note 91, at 788 ("Stripped to its core components, the paren-
tal rights doctrine, with its mixture of biological and social connections, is remarkably
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replaces older notions of property in children with a model in which
parental rights, even if sometimes experienced as akin to property
rights, are defined and justified according to day-to-day caretaking
relationships.
The concrete connection protected by the biology-plus-relationship
test is also distinct from a related but weaker emotional consideration:
a person's abstract desire to be the parent of a child. Some commenta-
tors have argued that the right of privacy includes a "right to procre-
ate" that protects this abstract desire." 4 Skinner v. Oklahoma, which
struck down a statute employing sterilization as a criminal penalty,18
provides some support for this argument, as does Eisenstadt v. Baird,
which characterized the right to privacy as including "the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.' 86
Claims of a "right to procreate," however, ignore that the privacy
cases turned on the nature of the state's interference in procreation,
not on an affirmative right to generate offspring. In the contraception
and abortion cases, as in Skinner, the Court's concern was largely for
the violation of physical integrity and private space."8 7 In contrast, the
"right to procreate" and its reciprocal "right not to procreate" have
been invoked to support claims of a right to clone oneself, a right to
use genetic material and frozen embryos in a particular fashion, and
a right to make an enforceable surrogacy contract.'88 Such claims go
well beyond the concerns about involuntary sterilization in Skinner.'89
As Lehr demonstrates, the Court has not deemed the abstract desire
to be a parent, unconnected to a caretaking relationship with a par-
ticular child, worthy of constitutional protection. 9 °
flexible and responsive to diverse family formations that both honor and support the role
and place of the family in our constitutional system.").
184. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 24, 178.
185. 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
186. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
187. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
188. See ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 32-34; Justyn Lezin, Note, (Mis)conceptions:
Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women's Access to Reproductive Technology
and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 203-04 (2003) (discussing
the contested status of the "right to procreate" and preconception contractual agree-
ments); see also Appell, supra note 91, at 742 ("A rather extreme manifestation of an
intent-based parent conception is the theory that there is a constitutional right to pro-
create that requires that the state.., enforce preconception agreements, over the claims
of donors and surrogates.").
189. See Rao, supra note 9, at 1117 ('"There is... no constitutional right to buy or sell
sperm, eggs, embryos, or gestational services .... ); see also John A. Robertson, Gay and
Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323 (2004);
Lezin, supra note 188 (discussing the contested status of the "right to procreate). But see
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1588-91 (1979) (arguing
that the physical burdens of pregnancy are the most important for analyzing a constitu-
tional right to abortion and criticizing Roe for emphasizing the "family planning" interest).
190. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983).
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2. The Political Role of the Family
Although Skinner suggests the possibility of some protection for
the "right to procreate," the Court decided that case as a matter of
equal protection, not liberty; doctrinally, the problem was arbitrary
sterilization, not sterilization itself.'9 ' Skinner's equal protection
focus fits comfortably with the second rationale for protecting pa-
rental rights: society's interest in using the family as a decentralized,
non-state-controlled form of political organization. This less intui-
tive justification for parental rights featured prominently in Meyer
v. Nebraska9 ' and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,193 which argued that
protection of parental rights is linked to the preservation of a demo-
cratic, pluralist form of government.
This rationale speaks directly to the requirement that substan-
tive due process rights must be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'94 The first rationale focuses on the privacy of family rela-
tionships; the second puts the family in a political context and claims
that protection of parental rights is necessary for democracy. In Meyer
the Court explained the connection:
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted
their subsequent education and training to official guardians.
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men
of great genius [including Plato, whom the Court quotes] their
ideas touching the relation between individual and state were
wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest.195
In Pierce the Court summarized, "[tihe fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any gen-
eral power of the state to standardize its children."'96 In both cases,
the Court treated the family as a micro-culture that must be permit-
ted a say in raising "its own" children to survive and reproduce itself.
The prospect of Spartan boarding schools in this country may
seem an idle threat, but an irony of the Court's pronouncements in
191. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538-42 (1972). By deciding Skinner on equal
protection grounds, the Court avoided direct conflict with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) ('CThree generations of imbeciles are enough."). Although Buck is usually treated
as if it were no longer good law, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), cited Buck with
approval, to support the proposition that the state has an interest in determining the
course of a woman's pregnancy.
192. 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923).
193. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
194. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
195. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
196. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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Meyer and Pierce is that they were written at a time when the
United States government was sending American Indians to just
such Spartan schools. Continuing until well after World War II, tens
of thousands of Native children were removed from their homes and
sent to government-controlled boarding schools for the stated purpose
of eliminating their culture.'97 The overwhelming, if unfinished, suc-
cess of this effort demonstrates the importance of the Court's ar-
gument, which it deployed to protect the disfavored subcultures in
Meyer and Pierce (Germans and Catholics, respectively)."9 ' That his-
tory has also given us the Indian Child Welfare Act,199 which requires
preference for placing an Indian child for adoption within his or her
tribe, the only federal codification of the pluralist justification for pa-
rental rights. 00 To a much lesser degree, the specter of Spartan stan-
dardization of children hung over the third-party visitation statute
in Troxel, which transferred authority to decide a child's best interests
from the parent to the state.20 1
This political rationale for parental rights starts with the under-
standing that when a child is born into the world, someone must be
given the responsibility and privilege of raising her. This article fo-
cuses on the privilege more than the responsibility. Parental rights
also serve state interests by imposing responsibility for financial sup-
port of the child. Although courts proclaim that custody and visitation
are separate matters from financial support and cajole former spouses
not to withhold one to obtain the other, they are in truth a legal pack-
age. If Jonathan Lehr had been sued for child support, he would not
have been able to plead his lack of a caretaking relationship with
197. See STEVE HENDRICKS, THE UNQUIET GRAVE: THE FBI AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
SOUL OF INDIAN COUNTRY (2006) (describing Native American children forced to cut their
hair and burn traditional clothes and punished for practicing their religions or speaking
their languages). Protection of parental rights is also consistent with the historical origins
and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davis, supra note 12, at 1362 (discussing
deprivation of parental rights under slavery).
198. For a skeptical investigation of the moral foundation of Meyer and Pierce, as well
as a powerful warning about the dangers of treating a child as "a conduit for the parents'
religious expression, cultural identity, and class aspirations," see Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1114 (1992), and id. at 1000-01 ("Meyer announced a dangerous
form of liberty, the right to control another human being."). Woodhouse acknowledges
that parents are usually presumed to speak for children but argues that "constitution-
alizing this presumption as the parents' 'right' to speak, choose, and live through the
child has led to its being too often invoked in situations in which it is, at best, unnecessary
or, at worse, oppressive." Id. at 1115. Treating the question of cultural transmission not
as a right of the parents to express themselves but as society's need for parents to trans-
mit diverse cultures avoids some of those dangers.
199. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, § 105 (1978).
200. Efforts to promote race-matching or religion-matching in adoptions arguably reflect
the same concern.
201. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
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the child as a defense, but once his paternity was adjudicated for
support purposes he would have been entitled to seek visitation or
custody. Parental rights are thus part of a system that privatizes de-
pendence, placing responsibility for caretaking on the family rather
than the state.
This aspect of parental status should not play an important role
in the doctrine of parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the question of parental rights arises when the state tries to
deny parental rights to a willing aspirant. Such parents presumably
know that the rights they seek come with responsibilities. In light of
the state's interest in private support of children, to deny parental
rights is perverse. For example, in Stanley, the state asserted that
its interests were served by denying rights to unwed fathers in part
because .' it is necessary to impose upon at least one of the parties
legal responsibility for the welfare of [the child], and since necessarily
the female is present at the birth of the child and identifiable as the
mother,' the State has selected [her]."° 2 Regardless of whether assign-
ing responsibility to the mother at birth is "necessary," it makes no
sense to refuse the offer of support implicit in the father's bid for rec-
ognition as a parent of a child who would otherwise be an orphan."'
Although the desire to privatize dependence may be an important
reason why states wish to recognize parental rights, it does not make
sense as a justification for overriding the state's decision in the
name of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, feminists generally consider the privatization of depen-
dency a bad thing, and many feminists argue that the state should see
itself as substantially more responsible for children." 4 That critique,
however, does not call for the elimination of parental rights. Professor
Fineman, for example, calls for state support of caretaking units (e.g.,
parent and child), not the state's assumption of the entire caretaking
role.2" 5 The success of this critical project thus depends on establish-
ing greater separation between parental rights and responsibilities. 06
202. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 n. 1 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Illinois's brief, alteration in original).
203. The facts of Stanley present a somewhat poor case for this point: as the dissent
pointed out, Stanley may not have intended to take actual physical custody of the children,
had previously been adjudicated an unfit parent (of another child), and may have been
more interested in control over the welfare money that went with the children. Id. Those
facts were properly ignored by a Court asked to decide not whether Stanley was a fit
parent but whether the state could declare him not to be a parent by fiat and thus remove
the children without regard to his fitness. Id.
204. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Rethinking
Relationships in the Child Welfare System, 12 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 448 (2004).
205. Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1207 (1999).
206. Just as divorced parents link visitation and child support despite judicial
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Some separation already exists under Fourteenth Amendment doc-
trine, which, to date, requires parents to "earn" their parental rights
(by gestation and birth, marriage, or biology-plus-relationship) but
does not seem to limit the state's ability to impose parenthood on a
much lesser showing (often biology or relationship).2 °7
Because the Fourteenth Amendment is primarily understood as
imposing constraints on state action, the polices underlying parental
rights doctrine are those policies likely to be threatened by the state.
Although the rules of parental responsibility may serve the state's
desire to avoid public responsibility (and the child's interest in sup-
port, given a stingy state), rules of parental rights serve a different
political purpose: protecting the socialization of children from undue
state control.
If only the best interests of the child were considered at the
time of birth, the state could choose a child's parents from millions
of Americans. Doing so would allow the state to standardize its chil-
dren through legislative and judicial biases: to assign children to par-
ents deemed deserving under criteria chosen by the ruling class. By
instead entrusting the child to his or her family of birth, the doctrine
that parental rights are rooted in biology reduces the state's role in
selecting parents.2"8 It also parallels the Fourteenth Amendment's
method for assigning national citizenship: if you are born here, you
are ours.20 9 Under this rationale, constitutional protection of parental
rights harnesses the family as a unit of decentralized social organi-
zation, serving a political purpose wholly separate from the best
interests of either the child or the parent.
How does the biology-plus-relationship test accord with the polit-
ical justification for parental rights? Of the unwed father cases, only
Stanley involved the state claiming the right to take charge of the
child itself.210 In that situation, the relationship hurdle may seem un-
duly high: given a choice between the state and even an uninvolved
admonishment, see Greg Geisman, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain:
Child Support and Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. REV. 568 (1993), the
public has usually seen overt support of dependence as licensing greater public control over
the parent (including but not limited to her decisions about how to rear the child).
207. See Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology
"Plus" Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY
J. OF WOMEN & L. 47 (2004).
208. See Appell, supra note 91, at 710 (noting that biological relationship "is perhaps
the clearest, simplest standard that also minimizes the state's role in making individual-
ized decisions" and "promotes diversity by minimizing discriminatory choice that could
result in homogenization").
209. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
210. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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father, the political rationale would favor the father. Perhaps in cases
like Stanley, the bar should be lowered, but a high relationship bar
may serve the political rationale when the father is competing with
the mother and with alternative arrangements made by her. If a child
establishes relationships within an alternative family form, which
may lack a clear analogue to a father, the political perspective would
see not the absence of a father but a different kind of family.21' The
biology-plus-relationship test thus serves the political goal first by
assuming that the child is automatically attached to a mother chosen
by nature and happenstance, not by the state; second by conditioning
the father's rights on both parents' decision to parent together;212 and
third by providing the child of an involved father with an alternative
to the state in the event the mother is unavailable.
This model of parental rights as a means of political organization
depends on the Court's premise that the biological mother automati-
cally accrues parental rights at birth, a premise based entirely on the
fact that gestation and birth are the mother's acts. As science loosens
biology's control over the site of reproduction, the question arises
whether the same underlying constitutional concerns will continue
to drive assignment of parental rights or be replaced by other prin-
ciples, such as those of the market.
Part III evaluates the premise of mothers' rights that was the
basis for the biology-plus-relationship test and defends that premise
against the accusation that it improperly stereotypes women as loving
mothers. It also considers the law's choice among three contending
mothers (genetic, gestational, and intended) in light of the policies
justifying constitutional protection of parental rights. It concludes that
those policies favor recognizing the gestational mother as a parent
of the child she bears.
III. WHAT MAKES A WOMAN A MOTHER? ESSENTIALISM AND
BIOLOGY
The unwed father cases arose from changing social patterns and
the breakdown of the sharp division between men's and women's
roles; the legal dilemma over the definition of a mother has arisen
from changing technology. Advances in reproductive technology, and
211. The political rationale for parental rights thus supports, or at least does not oppose,
the position that "social parents" should receive parental rights when an existing legal
parent has voluntarily initiated a parenting relationship between the social parent and
the child. See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 9.
212. Again, states may be reluctant to allow mothers to defeat the claims of fathers by
denying access to the child, but the Supreme Court should not constitutionalize an auto-
matic right of biological fathers to establish their parental rights.
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the marketplace that has grown beside them, have led inevitably to
litigation over who is the "true mother."'213 Disputes over motherhood
arise not only when the gestational mother tries to keep the child de-
spite a surrogacy contract 214 but also when the intended parents re-
nege or a fertility clinic makes a mistake, such as implanting an in
vitro embryo in the wrong woman.2"5 Although the Supreme Court
has not yet accepted a case raising the issue of disputed motherhood,
for years lower courts have grappled with reproductive technology that
no longer allows them to take the identity of the mother as a given.
The emergence of new technology does not mean that courts
must reinvent the law of parental status from scratch.2"6 The Court's
biology-plus-relationship test tracked the first of the two reasons why
parental rights are protected.21 The answer to who is a mother should
also be guided by precedent and by the reasons parental rights are
protected. Unfortunately, both lower courts and legal commentators
213. See Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive Technology and Stolen Ova: Who is the Mother,
16 LAW & INEQ. 289 (1998).
214. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
215. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). See
generally Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, and Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003); Snyder, supra note 213.
In most surrogacy cases, the gestational mother has purported to sign away her parental
rights to the intended parents through a surrogacy contract. To avoid characterizing such
a contract as baby-selling, which would be illegal, proponents of enforcing the surrogacy
contract must define the gestational mother as "not the mother" (a strategy that recalls
the state's argument in Stanley that it did not have to hold a hearing on Stanley's fitness
because he simply was not a parent under state law). Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
650 (1972). Once that re-definition is accomplished, it becomes the legal definition of
maternity and will apply even in cases in which no surrogacy contract exists, since the
whole theory of the surrogacy cases is that the gestational "host" is not the mother, and
the money exchanged pursuant to the contract merely compensates her for services akin
to those of babysitter.
Richard Posner's strategy for avoiding the "baby-selling" label is to insist that what
is being sold is not the baby but the parent's rights. Since the parent does not "own" the
baby, he insists, the baby is not "sold." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 410, 423
(reprint ed., Harvard University Press 1994) (1992). This distinction fails because any
sale of an interest in property is merely a transfer of the rights held by the seller, not a
means of conferring absolute dominion. Lesser interests than a fee simple can be bought
and sold; animals are considered property, but a person who buys a dog does not thereby
acquire the right to abuse it.
216. See Garrison, supra note 9 (arguing for adaptation of existing precedent rather
than starting from scratch in the face of new technology); see also Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057,
1070 (discussing the non-uniqueness of"law of billboards").
217. The cases overtly protect the father's concrete connection with the child. The
father's abstract interest in his offspring is protected incidentally in the course of pro-
tecting his concrete relationship and may itself receive some minimal protection under
Lehr. Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See also Helms & Spence, supra note 74 (sug-
gesting that minimal notice provisions and best interests hearing are required). The in-
terest in protecting child-rearing from state control is relevant only in cases like Stanley,
where the mother is absent. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
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addressing issues of reproductive technology, especially surrogacy
contracts, have largely ignored the doctrinal roots of parental rights.21
This Part considers how the unwed father cases apply to women and
defends the Court's premise in those cases that a mother's parental
rights are established by pregnancy and birth. It also argues that this
premise is a necessary part of the Court's idea that the family serves
a public, political purpose as well as private ends. To reject the Court's
premise would undermine the original reasons for giving constitu-
tional protection to parental rights.
A. The Problem of Essentialism
In Stanley and Caban, the Supreme Court adopted the premise
that gestation and birth establish the same kind of relationship be-
tween a woman and a child that the Court demanded of the unwed
fathers who claimed parental rights. A substantial body of feminist
criticism calls that premise essentialist and accuses the Court of ste-
reotyping women as mothers and nurturing caregivers. The opinions
in the unwed father cases do reflect gender stereotypes, and the Court
at times casts women, post-birth, as inherently nurturing and loving
toward their children. Rejecting these stereotypes, however, does not
require that we also reject any meaningful difference between biolog-
ical motherhood and biological fatherhood. Nonetheless, judges and
commentators have exhibited a growing belief that recognizing any
difference between a mother's and a father's relationship to newborn
offspring is inappropriately essentialist.
The fear of stereotyping dominated the opinions in Nguyen v.
INS and drove the Court to minimize the relevance of biological dif-
ference.219 Tuan Anh Nguyen was the child of an American man and
a Vietnamese woman.22 ° He was born in Vietnam but raised almost
entirely by his father, with whom he lived in the United States from
the time he was five years old.22" ' At the age of twenty-two, Nguyen
pleaded guilty to a felony, and the INS tried to deport him. 2 Nguyen
claimed he was entitled to United States citizenship.223 By federal
law, any child of a female citizen can claim citizenship no matter
where born, but a child born abroad to an unwed American father
218. This failure is not surprising, as courts typically decide questions of parental rights
in family law settings that involve many additional considerations, and courts in that
setting are probably most accustomed to deciding cases according to the best interests
of the child.
219. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).





can become a United States citizen only if formally acknowledged.224
Nguyen's problem was that the acknowledgement must occur before
the child turns eighteen; he and his father had missed their chance.225
In their suit, they claimed the law discriminated against male citizens
by imposing requirements beyond those required for female citizens
to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.226
The INS argued that this distinction between mothers and
fathers served the government's interest in ensuring a meaningful
relationship between the child and the citizen parent, and by ex-
tension between the child and the United States.227 A mother, said the
INS, has a relationship with her child by the fact of gestation and
birth; a father might not even know his child exists.228 Based on the
unwed father cases, which made the same presumption, the INS
probably thought it was on solid ground, but the Court, led by Justice
Kennedy, was wary of stereotyping women as mothers and declined
to endorse the INS's argument. Instead, it upheld the law on the basis
of a different governmental interest than the one asserted by the INS:
the law ensured an "opportunity" for a meaningful relationship, which
the mother satisfied by her necessary "presence at the birth," as op-
posed to the certainty of her relationship with the child through ges-
tation and birth.229
Defending itself against the dissent's accusations of stereotyping,
the majority claimed that by not assuming an automatic relationship
between mother and child - by holding that the mother was merely
present in the same place at the same time as the child and thus
could have a relationship - it had avoided stereotyping women as
caregivers. 2 " The additional requirement for a father (that he must
acknowledge the child) was needed because he was not necessarily
present at birth.23' Thus was the process of growing a fetus, laboring,
and delivering a child reduced to being "present" at the child's arrival,
as if children were dropped in their mothers' laps by storks.232
224. Id. at 59 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)).
225. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59.
226. Id. at 58. The Court had previously granted certiorari to resolve this issue in Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), but concluded in that case that the child lacked standing
to assert what the Court perceived to be the right of the citizen parent to pass on citizen-
ship free of discrimination on the basis of his sex.
227. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
228. Id. at 79-80.
229. Id. at 64-68.
230. Id. at 55.
231. Id. at 62.
232. See DUMBO (Walt Disney Co. 1941) (opening sequence, in which Mrs. Jumbo estab-
lishes her relationship with Jumbo Jr., later dubbed Dumbo, after delivery by stork; at
no point does the film reference a Mr. Jumbo).
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Justice O'Connor's dissent (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer) correctly lambasted the majority's new "opportunity"
rationale.233 There was no evidence that this rationale described
Congress's actual purpose when it passed the law,234 and the dissent
exposed the law as having arisen out of a "history of sex discrimination
in laws governing the transmission of citizenship and with respect to
parental responsibilities for children. '235 The dissent also questioned
whether the "opportunity" rationale qualified as an "important" gov-
ernmental interest, as required for intermediate scrutiny.236
The dissent also refused to acknowledge any difference between
motherhood and fatherhood, even at the time of birth, which is trou-
bling. 237 The dissent's approach suggests that a new mother, like a
233. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 85-87 (2001). Largely for the reasons mentioned in this
paragraph, my criticism of the Nguyen dissent does not necessarily imply that Nguyen
was correctly decided, only that it is a harder case for feminists than the dissent suggests.
Because a parent-child relationship clearly existed, the citizen-father and his child should
have been deemed similarly situated to citizen-mothers and their children, triggering
intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (reaffirming
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classification). Nguyen would then have been the first
application of the biology-plus-relationship test outside the context of mere parental iden-
tity. In addition, the dissent should have directly confronted the relationship between
rights and responsibilities, particularly in light of the majority's rather shocking embrace
of the government's claimed interest in protecting itself from citizenship claims brought
by the children of U.S. military personnel serving abroad. See Silbaugh, supra note 15,
at 1159 (noting that the Nguyen Court failed to see "that the conferral of a right is also
the conferral of a responsibility in this citizenship statute"); Laura Weinrib, Protecting
Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 222 (2003).
234. The Court's decision in U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 536-40 (1996), had
strongly suggested that the government could not justify a sex classification on the basis
of state interests first identified for purposes of the litigation.
235. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 84-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The government's claim was premised on
an actual relationship with the mother creating a concrete tie to the United States, at least
an arguably relevant factor in conferring citizenship. It is much harder to say (and the
majority did not say) why a person's right to claim U.S. citizenship should depend on
whether she had an "opportunity" to form a bond with the nation between birth and her
first nap. Almost as mysterious is the majority's reliance on the need to assure that the
aspiring citizen is, in fact, the child of a U.S. citizen. Id. at 61. Even setting aside the
availability of DNA testing, the sex-based classification of mothers and fathers comes
into play only once the child reaches adulthood; if a question arises while the child is still
a minor, the father can "cure" the problem through formal acknowledgement of paternity.
The Court said the mother would be able to call upon "witnesses to the birth" to confirm
her parentage of the grown child. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. The likelihood of a mother
being able to produce such testimony eighteen years after the fact seems only slightly
greater than the likelihood of the father being able to produce witnesses to the conception.
237. For additional criticism of the Nguyen majority decision as essentialist, see Caroline
Rogus, Conflating Women's Biological and Sociological Roles - The Ideal of Motherhood,
Equal Protection, and the Implications of the Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 803 (2003), and Ashley Moore, The Child Citizenship Act: Too Little Too Late for Than
Nguyen, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 279 (2003). One effect of refusing to recognize
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new father, has only a potential relationship with her child and that
a new mother, like the unwed fathers in Stanley and Lehr, might have
no parental rights until she takes additional steps to establish a post-
birth relationship. The trouble here is that the premise of Stanley and
Lehr was that the mother already had a relationship with the child.
Despite the flaws of the Nguyen majority opinion, it at least echoed
the unwed father cases when it described the statutory requirement
as a "reasonable substitute" for the mother's opportunity to form a
relationship with her child."' The majority said that it was sensible
for Congress to provide such a substitute "in terms the male can ful-
fill." '239 The dissent, like the majority, refused to allow nine months
of biological caretaking to establish the mother's relationship with
the child because it incorrectly perceived that to do so it would have
to rely on stereotypes about mothers' feelings or instincts toward
their children.
2 40
This fear ignores the rationale behind the unwed father cases,
which turned on whether the father had acted as a parent toward the
child, not whether he did so lovingly or resentfully or whether the
children could be proven psychologically dependent on him.241 Rec-
ognizing that a woman who gives birth has acted as a parent is not
essentialism. It is even-handed application of a comparable criterion
for women and men claiming parental rights. The Court's parenthood
test "in terms the male can fulfill" happens to be a test the female can
also fulfill. Equal protection requires acknowledging her parental
rights at the same point that she meets the criteria that would earn
the father his parental rights. Under those criteria - biology plus
relationship - a mother's parental rights are fully established at the
time of birth. The Nguyen dissent's insistence on maternal and pater-
nal equivalence amounts to redefining parenthood based on a male
model that denigrates gestation as an aspect of biological motherhood
merely because it has no analogue in biological fatherhood.
this difference is to normalize reproductive technology. For example, one aspiring female
lawyer looked forward to the time when she, like a male attorney, could have a child with-
out the hassle of pregnancy. See Merry Jean Chan, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual
Property Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (2003). If that route to parent-
hood becomes widely accepted as a first choice rather than a backup, women's grounds
for demanding accommodation of pregnancy will be eroded. Current debates over accom-
modation of breastfeeding illustrate that certain technologies, such as breast pumps and
baby formula, have already been normalized. See Frances Bizgidi, Returning to Work While
Breastfeeding, 68 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2199 (2003). Moreover, the belief that pregnancy
is the most difficult part of parenting to combine with a career path designed for unen-
cumbered men is strikingly naive.
238. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
239. Id. at 67.
240. Id. at 87-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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The foregoing argument treats the mother's gestation both as bi-
ology and as analogous to the affirmative acts of parenting required
for men to establish parental rights under the unwed father cases. In
comparison to those affirmative acts, gestation seems passive, and
it is possible to endure nine months of pregnancy without taking an
affirmative step to promote the welfare of the eventual child. None-
theless, the analogy holds both because of the origins of the biology-
plus-relationship test and because of what the Court actually required
of the unwed fathers.
First, recall that the biology-plus-relationship test was based on
motherhood and adapted to fatherhood. The man has to meet this test
by an affirmative act since male caretaking is not biologically neces-
sary for the production of offspring, nor are men capable of biological
caretaking. To say that the father's caretaking is superior because
it is chosen would be to ignore that his choice is whether to make a
contribution to what the mother has already done.242
Second, as discussed above, the Court did not require the unwed
fathers to produce evidence of either a psychological bond with the
child or a history of specific caretaking work - such as changing
diapers, making dinner, or the like. Justifying the automatic rights
of married fathers would have been harder under such a standard.
The Court's concern instead seems to have been whether the father
was part of the child's everyday life;243 whether his influence was good
or bad would be the concern of fitness and custody proceedings.244
Regardless of whether a gestational mother takes affirmative steps
to enhance the child's welfare, she is, for better or worse, the child's
everyday life.245
The Court's recognition of the biological mother as the initial
constitutional parent thus serves both of the policies reflected in the
biology-plus-relationship test: the maintenance of an existing care-
taking relationship and the assignment of parental rights by a rule
that cannot be systematically controlled by the state. The approach
of both Nguyen opinions would undermine these policies by dis-
regarding the caretaking relationship of gestation and denying the
242. It also ignores that the mother, too, has a choice, although the option of abortion
is not a practically available option for many women. Even for those to whom it is easily
available, it is too complex a decision to treat as the legal equivalent of whether to con-
ceive in the first place. But see Baker, supra note 111 (arguing that a woman's decision
to carry to term over objection of biological father should make her solely responsible for
child support).
243. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
244. Cf. Baker, supra note 111, at 1564 (discussing how parents transmit values).
245. As with fathers, the question of parental fitness is distinct from the question of
initial parental status. A gestational mother can be deemed the child's initial parent but
nonetheless have her parental rights terminated on the same terms that would apply to
any other parent. See Spitko, supra note 9, at 108 n.50.
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newborn child's membership, by virtue of birth, in the gestational
mother's family.
The remainder of this article turns to some of the questions that
reproductive technology raises for the status of the gestational
mother. Courts facing disputes over technological parenthood should
be mindful of the underlying justifications for the constitutional con-
straints on parental rights, and of the biology-plus-relationship test
that reflects those justifications. That means, first, recognizing that
genetics are relatively unimportant to the law's ends. The important
role of biology in assigning parental rights lies in the role of gestation,
which, in addition to likely giving rise to emotional bonds,246 assigns
newborn children to families in a way the state cannot easily control.
None of these considerations alone gives a definitive answer to one
important question about the law of reproductive technology: the en-
forceability of surrogacy contracts. They do, however, shed light on
some reasons why we should pause before consigning the rights of
gestational mothers to the free market.
B. The Role of Genes
Nguyen notwithstanding, a woman who conceives and gestates
offspring is plainly a parent for Fourteenth Amendment purposes
because she is the biological parent and is presumed to have a rela-
tionship with the child.247 Since she was the prototype for the biology-
plus-relationship test, we should not be surprised that she easily
passes it. Worth considering more precisely is how the female can
fulfill this test designed for the male.24
First, we know from Quilloin and Lehr that her parental rights
do not derive solely from her genetic parenthood of the child.24 s If
246. For a brief discussion on the development of emotional bonds between gestational
mothers and fetuses, see Amy Salisbury, et al., Maternal-Fetal Attachment, 289 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N. 1701 (2003).
247. Schultz, supra note 3, at 390.
248. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) ("in terms the male can fulfill").
249. Some writers on surrogacy contracts have argued that the traditional recognition
of the birth mother is indeterminate in the surrogacy context because, at common law,
birth might merely have been a proxy for genes. See Hill, supra note 6, at 370 (discussing
"the ancient dictum mater est quam [gestatio] demonstrat (by gestation the mother is
demonstrated)"). This argument is anachronistic: the common law did not need to decide
whether its rule was "really" about genes or gestation because the two were inseparable.
Genetics is a relatively new field, and at least some contributors to the development of
any common law rule that may have existed likely shared the belief that the mother was
"merely" a vessel for the father's seed. See FIELD, supra note 9, at 29; she was nonetheless
identified as a parent. Indeed, recent research has shown that the "ancient dictum" relied
on by Hill and others in fact originated in 1983. Cindy L. Baldassi, Mater est quam gestatio
demonstrat: A Cautionary Tale (Univ. of British Columbia Faculty of Law Working Paper
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genetics were controlling, then genetic fathers would have exactly the
same rights as genetic mothers. The Court, however, held that de-
spite the equality of genetics between men and women, how a woman
becomes and is a mother is different from how a man becomes and
is a father. The parenthood protected by the Constitution, said the
Court, must include a caretaking relationship.
It does not follow that a gestational mother who lacks a genetic
tie automatically fails the biology prong of the biology-plus-relation-
ship test. Consider again our prototype, the woman who is a genetic
parent of the child and who, for nine months, shares diet, digestion,
movements, sleep, and a range of other physical and emotional func-
tions with the child. In the unwed father cases, the Court looked to
her and saw two important traits, which it translated into terms men
could fulfill. It would be ironic indeed to demand that women satisfy
this test on the new male terms to establish parental rights.25 ° Men
satisfy the "biology" prong of the test merely by contributing genes be-
cause that is all they can do. A father's "relationship" with his child
may be motivated by the biological connection, but the relationship
develops independent of biology. The mother has no similarly clear
dichotomy between "biology" and "relationship." Her initial relation-
ship with the child flows from biology, a biology far more symbiotic
than the transmission of DNA.251 To hold that women fulfill the biol-
ogy requirement with genes and the relationship requirement with
gestation would impose a male model on women, even in applying a
test that was originally based on women's experience.
A gestational mother has both a biological connection with the
child and the same caretaking relationship as the prototypical mother.
She may lack the genetic tie of the prototypical mother, but she has,
by virtue of biological connection and nine months of caretaking, as
Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927147 (documenting the coining of
the Latin phrase and its mistaken attribution to ancient law, and showing how "a maxim
designed to elevate gestation to the definition of legal maternity [has been interpreted]
as including or even privileging the genetic tie"). Whatever the content or intent of the
common law rules, however, the unwed father cases tell us that genes alone are not suf-
ficient for constitutional purposes.
250. See Colb, supra note 94, at 114 (arguing that even Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
in Michael H. elevated genetics because it focused on Michael's genetic connection with
Victoria rather than on his caretaking relationship).
251. Although this fact should not be determinative, it is interesting to note increasing
evidence that traits, including some heritable traits, are determined not just by DNA but
also by the uterine environment. Interest in the newly revived field of epigenetics, which
studies this kind of inheritance, is displacing scientists' near obsession with the genome
as a "blueprint" for a person. See generally Alan P. Wolffe & Marjori A. Matzke, Epi-
genetics: Regulation Through Repression, 286 SCIENCE 481-86 (1999) (explaining the basics
of epigenetics); NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FROM THE BLUEPRINT
TO YOU (2003) (explaining genomes as blueprints), available at http://www.genome.gov/
12511466 (click on links to access each chapter) (last visited January 13, 2006).
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strong a claim to parental rights as a genetic father who establishes
a caretaking relationship after birth.252
Despite the unwed father cases and their emphasis on caretaking
relationships, genetic ties often overwhelm other considerations when
courts have to decide who is the "real" mother. This phenomenon
shows two ways in which gametes (sperm and ova) have been com-
modified. First, society and the courts have readily accepted the prac-
tice of sperm and egg "donation," although not really a donation
because a fee is often paid.2 3 This acceptance of the sale of gametes,
however, may also promote the view that gametes belong to their pro-
ducers unless and until they are properly sold, even if they have been
turned into a baby in the meantime.5 4 Without proper attention to
the principles underlying the assignment of parental rights, owner-
ship of gametes may slip too easily into ownership of children based
on genetics alone, regardless of relationship.
For example, in the famous In the Matter of Baby M, the New
Jersey Supreme Court voided the surrogacy contract between the
gestational mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, and the intended parents,
William and Elizabeth Stern, only because Whitehead was also the
genetic mother, not merely the gestator.25 The contract thus dis-
missed, the court saw the case as a custody dispute between genetic
mother Whitehead and genetic father William Stern.25 Elizabeth
Stern, the intended mother, had no standing in the dispute.
2 57
By contrast, when an intended mother gives an egg for another
woman to carry, courts often recognize her as the legal mother re-
gardless of other considerations. For example, in Johnson v. Calvert,
a California court likened the gestational mother to a foster mother.25
The court granted exclusive parental rights to the intended parents
who had provided the egg and sperm for the gestational mother to
carry.259
252. Consider too the alternative: if the gestational mother does not have parental rights
to the child of a surrogacy arrangement at the time of birth then, at least as far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, no one does. The genetic parents have not yet estab-
lished a relationship on which to base a claim. In theory, that leaves the state free, at the
time of birth, to recognize none of their claims.
253. See Elizabeth Kaledin, Inside the Business of Egg Donation, CBS NEWS, May 17,
2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/17/eveningnews/printablel626874.shtml
(last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
254. See FIELD, supra note 11, at 17-19.
255. 537 A.2d 1227, at 1246 (N.J. 1988).
256. Id. at 1255-56.
257. Id. at 1241.
258. 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993).
259. Johnson involved a surrogacy contract, but the decision seemed to turn on genes.
See Dalton, supra note 122, at 303 ('It is not clear why genetics suddenly became of para-
mount importance to the courts, especially considering their long history of downplaying
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The New York case of Perry-Rogers v. Fasano also elevated genet-
ics over other factors.2" The Perry-Rogerses created embryos through
in vitro fertilization, but attempts to implant them in Deborah Perry-
Rogers were unsuccessful.26' At least one of their embryos, however,
was mistakenly implanted in Donna Fasano, another patient at the
same fertility clinic. Fasano, who for nine months believed herself
pregnant with twins, gave birth to one boy who was her and her hus-
band's genetic child and another who was the Perry-Rogerses' genetic
son. 2 Fasano voluntarily surrendered custody of the second child
to the Perry-Rogerses, on condition that they allow her visitation.6 3
When they reneged and she sought to enforce that agreement, the
court declared that Fasano was a legal stranger to the second child,
and that the Perry-Rogerses were his parents.2
A genetic relationship has several advantages for determining
parenthood that make it attractive to courts. Identifying parents by
DNA is easy and can be done at any time.265 At least for now, testing
always results in exactly one female mother and exactly one male
father. It is superficially sex-neutral, since the mother and father
make equal genetic contributions.266 For a court in search of a clear
rule for identifying parents, the only drawback to genetics is the
widespread social acceptance of donating sperm and, increasingly,
ova. Those practices, however, can be accommodated by allowing
genetic rights to be transferred like any other property.267 Thus, in
the California case In re Marriage of Buzzanca, a couple created an
embryo using donated genetic material, which was then implanted
in another woman for gestation.268 The court allowed the intended
mother to stand in the shoes of the egg donor and be recognized as
the legal mother.269
The problem arises when the rules of the gamete market are ap-
plied to babies already born, as in Perry-Rogers. In that context, the
its importance in favor of other factors ... ").
260. 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
261. Id. at 21.
262. The difference was readily apparent because the Fasanos were black and the Perry-
Rogerses were white. Id. at 22. It seems likely that the racial difference influenced the
court's emphasis on genetics. See Bender, supra note 215, at 54-76.
263. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
264. Id. at 25, 27.
265. See D.H. Kaye, DNA Paternity Probabilities, 24 FAM. L.Q. 279, 281 (1990).
266. Id. at 283.
267. For discussions of property rights assigned to ova and sperm, see Kathleen R.
Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth,
31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997); Bonnie Steinbeck, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. &
POLVY REV. 57 (1995).
268. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
269. Id. at 291.
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genetic approach has several pernicious effects. First, treating DNA
as the essence of biological parenthood ignores that biological mother-
hood consists not just of DNA but also of other biological functions.
To thus elevate DNA is to impose the experience of biological father-
hood on biological motherhood. Second, others have chronicled the
harm that exaltation of genetics works for families with adoptive,
same-sex, or other non-traditional sets of parents.27 °
Third, the genetic preference currently being written into sur-
rogacy law encourages practices that will harm some of the parents
and children in those arrangements. Couples interested in hiring a
"surrogate" gestational mother are well-advised that their legal claim
to the child(ren), should the gestational mother change her mind, will
be much stronger if the egg comes from the couple.27' The law thus
gives them an incentive to undergo egg extraction, a prolonged, diffi-
cult process culminating in surgery.2" 2 The resulting eggs are fertil-
ized in vitro (with sperm from the couple or a donor), and several
embryos are implanted in the gestational mother, often resulting in
a risky pregnancy (to her and the babies).273 Although some people
might choose these risks regardless of the law due to a personal belief
in the importance of genetics, for the law to promote such activity is
perverse, especially when the law itself has consistently downplayed
genetics. Despite the compelling expost argument that a woman who
has undergone egg extraction has a stronger claim to the resulting
child than one who has merely made payments on a surrogacy con-
tract, to distinguish between the two is likely a mistake.274
In summary, genes alone are not sufficient for constitutional
status as a parent. Gestation is the traditional means of identifying
an initial parent, and it satisfies the biology-plus-relationship test.
Gestation should thus be sufficient to establish constitutional paren-
tal rights. By analogy to gestation, genes plus a relationship are also
sufficient. That leaves the question of contract, including a contract
270. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 323, 325, 329 (2004); see also Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian Centered Critique of "Genetic
Parenthood", 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 591, 594-608 (2006).
271. See In the Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1988).
272. See Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 903-04 (2000) (describing the risks involved in egg extraction).
273. Multiple pregnancies can also lead to disputes when the gestational mother refuses
the intended parents' demand that she undergo a reductive abortion. Buss, supra note
15, at 674 n.89 (citing Tyche Hendricks et al., More Than They Bargained For: Surrogate
Mother Sues Berkeley Couple After Refusing to Abort One of Their Twin Fetuses, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 11, 2001, at Al).
274. The same is true in cases involving lesbian couples, who in most cases do not need
a surrogate gestational mother. One member of the couple may choose to have an egg
extracted for the other to carry for personal reasons, but the law should not compel them
to take this route to secure their joint parental status.
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in which the consideration comprises not only a benefit to the obli-
gor but also a physical and emotional detriment (egg extraction) by
the obligee.
C. Family Citizenship
Assigning parental rights to the gestational mother is a more
faithful application of the unwed father precedents than assigning
parental rights on the basis of genetics. The preference for the gesta-
tional mother is grounded in the caretaking she necessarily performs,
not on a stereotype that women, but not men, are inherently nurtur-
ing. Neither of these conclusions, however, necessarily prevents the
gestational mother from waiving her parental rights through contract.
This section offers some thoughts on the issue of surrogacy contracts:
what effect should the existence of a contract, or other pre-conception
arrangement by adults, have on the gestational mother's status as
a constitutional parent?
Reproductive technology has made more tenable the idea of
disregarding biology to assign parental rights on the basis of "pre-
conception intent."27 ' "Pre-conception intent" can include, for example,
an agreement among a lesbian couple and a sperm donor that makes
the two women the "intended parents" of the biological offspring of
one of the women and the sperm donor.2"6 Intent theory would pro-
tect the parental rights of both women if they later disputed custody
rather than favoring the biological mother.2 7' Intent theory also
favors enforcement of surrogacy contracts.278
The main practical justification for intent theory is that it pro-
tects the "right to procreate": enforcing surrogacy contracts helps in-
fertile couples become parents.2 9 It thus protects the abstract longing
for a child discussed above. Proponents of the theory also argue that
refusing to enforce surrogacy contracts when gestational mothers
change their minds is paternalistic and perpetuates stereotypes of
women as excessively emotional and flighty.2 ° Finally, Marjorie
Schultz and others have argued that intent theory and reproductive
275. See Schultz, supra note 3; Hill, supra note 6.
276. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
277. But see Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal
Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433 (2005) (discussing problems with applying
intent theory to lesbian couples, including judicial reluctance to extend the intent approach
to lesbians and the theory's focus on pre-conception intent rather than agreements arising
after birth).




technology are a path to gender neutrality in family law.28' These
issues have been widely debated, and full treatment of them is be-
yond the scope of this article.282 What follows are some points that
courts should consider when trying to square the law of reproductive
technology with the justifications for constitutional protection of pa-
rental rights.
First, intent theory elevates the abstract desire of the contract-
ing couple above the concrete connection between the child and the
gestational mother, reversing the priorities embodied in existing pre-
cedent.28 3 It disregards both the biology and the caretaking relation-
ship of pregnancy.2" The couple's interest in the child appears at least
somewhat analogous to Jonathan Lehr's in that it is based on an ab-
stract desire for the child rather than on a relationship with the par-
ticular human being that the child is.28 Yet this analogy also seems
unfair in light of the effort and emotion the couple has invested, es-
pecially in cases involving egg donation. A great deal of attachment
is likely on their side, but none is likely on the child's side. Why the
couple's attachment should trump the surrogate's when only the
latter's is even possibly shared by the child is unclear.2 '
Enforcement of surrogacy contracts is also in tension with more
usual adoption procedures, in which a gestational mother cannot sign
a binding release of her parental rights until after the birth.2"7 If
women should be bound by their contracts and can be expected to
refrain from bonding with fetuses who are not "theirs," why are first-
trimester adoption agreements not enforceable? The answer is that
281. Id.
282. For broad responses to the points mentioned in the prior paragraph, see Shanley,
supra note 9, and Garrison, supra note 9.
283. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 322-23.
284. Unlike the political justification for parental rights, the concern for the connection
between the parent and child also serves the child's interests. Intent theory disregards
the child's interest and privileges a pre-conception decision made by a group of adults,
none of whom, at the time, is entitled to speak for the child. See Shanley, supra note 9,
at 621. Although enforcement of surrogacy contracts is often defended as respecting the
gestational mother's autonomy, this argument assumes that all she is doing is giving up
her own rights, which is not the case: she is also making a decision on behalf of the child.
Id. The notion that she can do so in advance fits comfortably with a property model that
sees newborns as fungible.
285. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
286. One can argue that the gestational mother will refrain from bonding with the
child because she "knows" it is not "hers," but that argument is a function of the legal
rule and could as easily (and as unrealistically) be applied to the contracting couple. See
DAN SAVAGE, THE KID: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER MY BOYFRIEND AND I DECIDED TO GET
PREGNANT (1999) (describing the need, as a prospective adoptive parent, to remind himself
constantly that "birth mothers change their minds," id. at 149, and describing the birth
mother's tearful relinquishment of the child, id. at 214).
287. If anything, U.S. adoption laws are subject to criticism for not allowing enough
time for birth mothers to change their minds. See supra note 143.
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intent theory is more concerned with ownership of the child as a
product and tends to vest gender-neutral "authorship""28 of the child
with greater importance than the gendered care provided through
gestation.
Second, the intent theory, like the Nguyen opinions, may under-
mine the political justification for parental rights. By suggesting that
neither parent has a significant relationship with the child until after
birth, Nguyen places both parents in the position of unwed fathers
like Lehr who have no day-to-day relationship with their children
and consequently no parental rights protected by the Constitution.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this position would let the state re-
move a child at birth and assign her to whatever parents the state de-
cides are best. Because one reason for protecting parental rights is to
minimize state choice in assigning children to families, at least one
person should be recognized as a parent at the time of birth without
involving the state in an evaluation of that person's merit as a par-
ent. Recognizing that the mother has a relationship with the child
by virtue of gestation and birth satisfies this need.
The immigration context of Nguyen highlights this political
function of parental rights in assigning a child "citizenship" in a par-
ticular family. Like the parental rights doctrine, which assigns a child
to the family of her biological origin, the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment assigns a child national citizenship based on
her place of birth. Both doctrines, biological parental rights and jus
soli citizenship, guard against state bias in making the assignment
to country or family.
As the Nguyen majority noted, the doctrine of jus soli citizen-
ship creates a classification on the basis of sex: any female citizen
can transmit citizenship to her child by ensuring that she is in the
United States for the child's birth, but a male citizen, who cannot con-
trol where his child is born, has no constitutional guarantee of his
child's citizenship.289 Although the statute challenged in Nguyen was
288. See Chan, supra note 237, at 1213-25 (analogizing children to intellectual property).
289. Thus when Congress drafted the naturalization statutes, it began with a constitu-
tional inequality, which it amplified by providing that any child of a female U.S. citizen,
no matter where born, can claim U.S. citizenship. This provision relieves a woman living
abroad of having to return to the U.S. during pregnancy to ensure her child's citizenship.
In effect, when a pregnant citizen travels abroad, she takes a little piece of the nation
with her.
This discussion is premised on the Court's holding in Miller v. Albright that the ability
to pass on citizenship is an interest held by the parent, so that, for example, the child
seeking citizenship lacked standing to challenge discrimination based on the sex of the
parent. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1998). This model of citizenship is a
troubling one in light of some of the factual scenarios addressed in the Nguyen opinions,
particularly the question of citizenship for the children of American servicemen serving
abroad. Id. at 438-39; see also Weinrib, supra note 233. The Nguyen majority endorsed
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more restrictive to fathers than to mothers, so is the Constitution.290
The Nguyen Court was unwilling to demand that Congress make up
for either the constitutional inequality or the difference in how men
and women are situated at their children's birth.291 Like the practice
of assigning a child to the family into which he or she is born, the
Citizenship Clause accepts the circumstances and location of birth
as determinative of status. To the extent that parental rights are pro-
tected not just as a matter of individual interests but as a matter of
political organization, applying the same rule to families makes sense.
In place of this automatic assignment of family "citizenship"
based on the child's place of gestation and birth, intent theory offers
the free market and its inherent bias in favor of wealth. Although this
market is not wholly controlled by the state (indeed, as is increasingly
the case with traditional, domestic adoptions, the gestational mother
may exercise substantial control in choosing the intended parents)
neither is the market necessarily committed to maintaining pluralism
or ensuring the transmission of a variety of cultures. A small surro-
gacy market will not transform us into Plato's republic, but that step
toward commodifying children and reproduction is a step away from
Fourteenth Amendment values.29 2
None of the foregoing compels the conclusion that the gestational
mother has all the parental rights and that the contracting couple has
none. The couple's investment is hard to ignore, especially in cases
involving egg extraction. States appear to have, and probably should
have, substantial leeway within broad constitutional constraints on
who may be deemed a parent.293 Consideration of the justifications
as a legitimate congressional objective the desire to avoid granting citizenship to such
a child unless the father voluntarily sought to take responsibility for the child. Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001). As the dissent pointed out, Congress's and the majority's
model of gender and citizenship is based on stereotypes about responsibility for children
born out of wedlock extended to an international scale. Id. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Although this article addresses parental rights and argues that the birthright
model of citizenship supports a model of birth-based assignment to a family, models of
parental responsibility might usefully inform reconsideration of a statute consciously
designed to promote avoidance of paternal responsibility by denying national respon-
sibility. See generally Silbaugh, supra note 15 (discussing rights and responsibilities in
family law).
290. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54-55 (2001).
291. Id. at 55.
292. In addition, how much the reproductive market will grow if it is legally acceptable
and its contracts usually enforced is impossible to say. Surrogacy, for example, could
remain a last resort for the infertile, or, if social regularization follows legal regulari-
zation, become a matter of personal choice (as is, for example, the choice of breast-feeding
versus formula), with resulting effects on career expectations as well as the rationalization
and internationalization of the industry. The argument that reproductive technology is
a path to gender equality in reproduction points in the direction of surrogacy as a wide-
spread option, not a medical last resort. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 372-94.
293. See Buss, supra note 15.
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for parental rights and the essential elements of parenting that
informed the unwed father cases suggests that the Constitution re-
quires some recognition of parental rights as a consequence of ges-
tational mothering.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's unwed father cases relied on a web of doc-
trine to give fathers an entitlement to parental rights comparable
to the rights of mothers. Analyzed thus, Stanley and Caban could
serve as a model for overruling cases such as Geduldig, which relied
on biological sex differences to justify discrimination, and as a model
for advancing a more flexible approach to equality in cases in which
women, rather than men, are disadvantaged by biology. Instead, they
are in danger of being rewritten to define constitutionally protected
parenthood based on a male baseline. This denigration of maternity
is more than a missed opportunity to radicalize the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on sex discrimination: it undermines the overall pro-
tection of parental rights and helps commodify reproduction. Even if
the Court does not want to extend the same approach to sex discrim-
ination cases, Stanley and Caban's approach to equality in parent-
hood is still worth saving, understanding, and applying to the new
dilemmas presented by reproductive technology.
